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Good name in man and woman, dear my lord,
Is the immediate jewel of their souls:
Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;
But he that filches from me my good name
Rob me of that which not enriches him,
And makes me poor indeed.
Shakespeare.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Libel is a professional hazard to journalists. The
newspaper man deals daily with every kind of human experience
—
crime, divorce, trials, arrests, civil suits, court decisions,
grand juries, marriage, death, congress, political campaigns,
elections and many others. In doing this, he may, through
carelessness or ignorance, blast the reputation of an in-
dividual and cause a libel suit.
Reputation and character are very often confused. To
most people, libel generally means defamation of character.
In fact, this belief is not so. Libel is concerned with
injury done to the reputation of an individual. A critic
has said, "character lives in a man; reputation outside of
him." Character is what a person is, in his heart;
Arthus, William R. , and Grosman, Ralph L. , The Law of
Newspapers
.
Second Edition, New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, Inc., 1940.
reputation is what he is known to be among his fellows
through his daily association with them. Only the in-
dividual himself can injure his character by yielding to
temptation. But any man, especially a newspaper man, may
injure the reputation of an individual. It is the repu-
tation of an individual, and not his character, that is
involved in a libel suit.
Since the risk to be involved in a libel suit is al-
ways there, a man or a woman, who contemplates a newspaper
career, should have some knowledge of the law of libel and
how to avoid libel suits.
A professor in the University of Kansas Law School
once told the students in journalism: "When in doubt,
see a lawyer." That was good advice, but oftentimes the
exigencies of newspaper publication require some speed in
the handling of news. There is no time to consult a law-
yer, no time even to discuss a point with fellow workers.
One must report, and report instantly.
Review of Literature
The principles concerned in the law of libel are very
much the same in all states and also for the Federal govern-
ment; however they vary in details from state to state. For
example, it would not be libelous to call a candidate in the
North a friend of the Negro, but it would probably be libelous
to call him so in the deeo South.
Most books on libel deal with the general principles
of law in this country as well as with those of the English
speaking world. M. L. Newell' s Slander and Libel , J. C.
Gatley's On Libel and Slander
, William G. Kale's The Law of
the Press
, William R. Arthur's The Law of Newspapers
,
Charles Angoff's The Book of Libel , Joseph Dean's Hatred
,
Ridicule or Contempt etc. are all of this nature. These
texts are so general in their treatment that the principles
of law established in one state become interwoven with those
of other states. Students who want to ascertain the rules
and exceptions in their particular states must search
through footnotes in texts to determine whether their
states support certain court decisions. In the absence of
such footnote authority, students may consider whether the
stated rules or exceptions of other states may be applicable
in their own states.
A few authors have provided libel texts or guidebooks
for certain states. Essays in the Law of Libel , written by
Leon R. Yankwich, is a book covering many of the intricacies
of the law relating to libel in California. Law and Press
,
written by William C. Lassiter, is a guidebook on the legal
aspects of news reporting, editing and publishing for news-
paper reporters, editors and publishers in North Carolina.
But this type of work is not available in Kansas. Newspaper
Libel in Kansas , an article written by Edward N. Doan and
published in the Kansas Editor in 1936, is an outline guide
for this subject. Many important cases from the Kansas
Supreme Court were cited to illustrate the law. But be-
cause of its length of the article, it is too brief and
incomplete.
Purpose and Methods of Study
Since there is no guidebook concerning the law of
libel in Kansas, this author hopes that through this effort
he can provide a useful report for the students of journal-
ism and newspaper reporters who choose Kansas to be their
theatre of operation.
This work is mainly an analysis of the statutes and
court decisions which pertain to libel in Kansas. It does
not attempt to go beyond this limitation. Most emphasis
has been placed upon court decisions which involve news-
paper libel. Of course, some of the libel cases which have
no direct application to newspaper libel have been mentioned
and quoted when the author believes that the rules laid down
in them would likewise apply to newspapers.
Sources of material for this study have been mainly
from the reports of the Kansas Supreme Court. Of course,
information derived in this manner has certain limiatations
in that it does not present a whole picture of libel suits.
Most libel suits are settled out of court. If the newspaper
recognizes that it was in error or that it would have dif-
ficulty in convincing a judge or jury of its defense, it
"buys off" the plaintiff with a cash settlement and perhaps
a published retraction and apology. Many other cases are
settled in the lower trial courts and never reach the Supreme
Court. But the decisions of the Supreme Court are important
and authoritative in that they do determine the general
pattern of the law.
It must be remembered that the cases reviewed by the
state Supreme Court are, for the most part, discussions of
legal technicalities, which are outside the scope of this
work. In citing the cases to support statements, the
author has therefore attempted to present only those
phases of the decisions that deal directly with the law
of libel.
KacDougall, Curtis D., Newsroom Problems and Policies
,
New York: The MacMillan Company, 1941, p. 307.
CHAPTER II
CIVIL LIBEL
General
To protect the good reputation of an individual from
injury done by defamatory publication, the law of defamation,
also known to the newspaperman as the law of libel, has been
developed.
It has long been recognized by the law that an individ-
ual has the right to enjoy a good reputation since it is
indispensable for him in his pursuit of happiness. A good
reputation gives him the respect and love of his family and
the esteem and confidence of his neighbors. According to
Judge Sanborn, a good reputation is indeed a person's
priceless possession:
"A good name is rather to be chosen than great
riches, and loving favor rather than silver and gold."
The respect and esteem of his fellows are among the
highest rewards of a well-spent life vouchsafed to
man in this existence. The hope of them is the in-
spiration of his youth, and their possession of
solace of his later years. A man of affairs, a
business man, who has been seen and known by his
fellowmen in the active pursuits of life for many
years, and who has developed a good character and
an unblemished reputation, has secured a possession
more useful and more valuable than lands, or houses,
or silver, or gold. Taxation may confiscate his
lands; fire may burn his houses; thieves may steal
his money; but his good name, his fair reputation
ought to go with him to the end—a ready shield
against the attacks of his enemies, and a powerful
aid in the competition and strife of daily life.
(Judge Sanborn in Times Publishing Co. v. Carlisle.
94 Fed. 765.
J
1
If the disparagement of a person's good name is ex-
pressed in some permanent form, such as printed or written
words, a picture, sign, symbol, or effigy, the act is
called libel; if it is expressed in some temporary form,
such as spoken words, looks, sounds or gestures, it is
called slander.
Not all defamatory statements are actionable. An
actionable statement usually contains these elements:
(1) The statement is defamatory in its character within
the meaning of the law; (2) the statement has been pub-
lished, as the law defines the term "published"; (3) the
person or persons defamed by the statement can be identi-
fied by the reasonable readers; (4) and the defamatory
statement has no legal excuses or defenses.
Libel Defined
Civil libel is an aspect of the common law the defini-
tions for which are found in the statutes and in the judicial
decisions of the courts. The Kansas General Statutes of
1935, section 21-2401, has defined libel of criminal acts
as follows:
'-Arthur, William R. and Grosman, Ralph L.
,
The Law of
Newspapers, New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1940.
A libel is the malicious defamation of a person,
made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture,
representation, or effigy, tending to provoke him to
wrath or expose him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social intercourse, or any malicious
defamation made public as aforesaid, designed to blacken
and vilify the memory of one who is dead, and tending
to scandalize or provoke his surviving relatives and
fr iends.
1
But no statute has ever defined libel of civil acts in
this state. This fact, however, does. not set the law of
libel at large in civil cases. The court explains:
It may be assumed that whatever is punishable as
libel, in the interest of the public welfare, may be
the basis of a civil action of tort for general damages
when such damages may be presumed, and for such special
damages as in fact resulted. The purpose of the leg-
islature in stating its definition was the same as
the purpose of Kent and Blackstone and Blount : to
stabilize and standardize the meaning of the term
"libel," in order to indicate the extent to which
the law protects reputation. When taken over into
the law of torts, the definition is merely an
authoritative statement of the meaning of a term.
The definition was not confined to those defamations
only which the authorities had held to be action-
able, such as those in Blackstone' s enumeration,
but was extended to include any kind of defamation „
which might fairly be covered by the language used.
The definitions of civil libel put forth by the courts
are inconsistent. In fact, they have been defined according
to the needs of the situation. Once the Supreme Court of
Kansas defined libel as a false publication concerning a
person named or described therein and which tends to provoke
See the Kansas General Statutes of 1935, section
21-2401.
2Jerald v. Houston, 124 Kan. 662.
him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred, contempt'
or ridicule, or to deprive him of the benefits of public
confidence and social intercourse.
Another time, the same court ruled that it was libelous
to charge editor and legislator with repeated intoxication
o
if the charge is untrue.
In another case, the court held that it was libelous
to call an individual an eunuch since the term holds him
up to public redicule and injures him in his social char-
acter .3
Of course, no definition should be considered to be
definite and changeless. Public opinion changes and hence
the meaning of the words, the laws and the interpretation
of the laws will also change. Mr. Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, has well said:
A word is not crystal, transparent and unchanged,
it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly
in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used.v
Whether a newspaper article is libelous is always a
question of law for the court to determine.
^napp v. Green, 102 Kan. 513-
T'he State v. Mayberry, 33 Kan. 442.
3Eckert v. VanPelt, 69 Kan. 357.
Vrowne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418.
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Publication
No civil action can be maintained for libel unless the
defamatory statement has been published. "To give a cause
of action there must be a publication by the defendant.
That is the foundation of action." The word "publication,"
however, is not used in the popular newspaper sense, as
being synonymous with printing. Publication for purposes
of defamation means any communication of defamatory matter
to a third person or persons. It is no legal wrong to
think evil of one's neighbor as long as one keeps his
uncharitable thoughts to himself. The law holds that
merely composing a libel is not actionable unless the
libel is published. The law also holds that the publi-
cation of the defamatory matter concerning the person de-
famed is not actionable because the publication cannot
injure his reputation though it may wound his feeling and
indirectly hurt his business. A man's reputation is not
the good opinion he has of himself, but the estimation in
which others hold him.
In the case of Lyon v. Lash, the Supreme Court of Kansas
has explained this point by quoting Odgers' words:
It is no publication when the words are only
communicated to the person defamed; for that cannot
Powell v. Gelston (1916) 2 K.B. 615, see Gatley on
Libel and Slander
.
London: Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 1953,
p. 34.
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injure his reputation. A man's reputation is the
estimate in which others hold him, not the opinion
which he has of himself. The attempt to diminish
our friend's good opinion of himself, though pos-
sibly unpleasant to him, is yet generally ineffectual,
and is certainly not actionalbe, unless some one else
overhears.
^
The same court, in the Buckwalter v. Gossow case, has
added the following opinion:
The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not
constitute an actionable publication, even though
the matter does actually reach the hands of a third
person, where this is not intended nor reasonably
to be expected by the sender...
. . .The wrath or personal indignation aroused in
the defamed cannot be computed or compensated in dam-
ages, although the wrong-doer may be punished by the
state for his wrongful act. So an assault from which
no public humiliation and no actual injury occurs
other than to the feelings of the assaulted may not
be the basis of an action for damages, although it
may subject the offender to a penalty.
If, however, the author of a libel sends it to
the defamed in such a manner as to indicate that he
intends it shall or that it is probable it will reach
other hands, and it does reach other hands, it is a
publication and may be the basis of damages.
It is clear that to publish alone a defamation to the
person defamed is not actionable in a civil libel but is
guilty of criminal libel. This situation is true because
the act tends to be a breach of the peace.
l-Lyon v. Lash, 74 Kan. 747.
2Buckwalter v. Gossow, 75 Kan. 148.
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Republication
Every republication of a libel is a new libel,
and each publisher is answerable for his act to the
same extent as if the calumny originated with him. 1
This rule has been adopted by all states hence the
republication of a libelous statement, or the publication
of that statement in other languages, makes the publisher,
or the one who procures its publication, liable the libelous
statement
.
The Kansas General Statutes of 1935, 21-24C2, provide:
Every person who makes or composes, dictates or
procures the same to be done , or who wilfully pub-
lishes or circulates such liabels, or in any way
knowingly and wilfully aids or assists in making,
publishing or circulating the same, shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment in the county jail not more
than one year, or by a fine not exceeding one
thousand dollars
.
When a defamatory statement is published in a newspaper,
everyone who takes a part in publishing it, or in procuring
its publication, is liable. Thus the publisher, the editor,
the reporter, the copy reader, the printer or even the
vendor of the newspaper is liable for any libel which ap-
pears in the publication unless he can satisfy the jury
that he was ignorant of the contents. But the onus of
proving lies on the defendant
.
Therefore, if a person who dictates or furnishes a
malicious statement to a reporter of a newspaper for
Morse v. Times-Republican Co., 124 Iowa R. 717.
2
See the Kansas General Statutes of 1935, 21-2402.
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publication, with the understanding that it will be pub-
lished, and such reporter makes the statement published as
it was given to him, the said person is also responsible
for libel, though he may not see what is written until after
the sane article is published.
Of course, a person who casually makes a false state-
ment to another, with no purpose of or intention that it
shall be written, or published, and even though the other
person may be a reporter for a newspaper, and the statement
should afterward be printed and published, will not be
9
guilty of libel.
In securing news, the words of the county sheriff,
the police chief, the prosecutor, or any public official
cannot be taken at face value and published without incur-
ring full liability. In civil libel cases, intent of the
publisher has no bearing. If he has injured wrongfully a
reputation, the law regards not the intent but the result,
and presumes intent.
When the Hutchinson Gazette relied upon the word of an
arresting officer for the name of one of his victims, it
found itself with a suit in its hands.
An article was published in the Sunday morning issue
as follows:
State v. Osborn, 54 Kan. 473.
2State v. Osborn, 54 Kan. 473-
14
Raided Rooming House—Sheriff Scot Sprout yester-
day raided the rooming house on First Avenue West
conducted by Ruth Newman. Two girls, Bess Stolen
and Minnie Hatfield, were charged with running an
immoral house. They were released on $500 bail. 1
After the publication of this article, it was discovered
that one of the girls arrested was Minnie Olson. Minnie
Hatfield sued for libel. Though apparently, it was the
sheriff's error, the newspaper paid for it.
In defending the case, the defendant alleged that the
language used in the article had no reference to the plain-
tiff and was so understood by persons reading it, and that
there v/ere other persons living in that community where the
paper was circulated named Minnie Hatfield.
The Supreme Court of Kansas disagreed and ruled the case
as follows:
The publication in plain terms specifically
charged the plaintiff, a single woman of unquestioned
character and reputation, with unchastity and im-
morality. As the imputation was untrue, malice is
inferred, and of itself it constitutes a libel.
(Cooper v. Seaverns, 81 Kan. 267.) The only excuse
is that a mistake was made in the use of plaintiff's
name, the writer saying that he did not know the
plaintiff and had no intention to hurt her, and also
that he did not know how he came to use her name.
This is not a valid excuse. The imputation against
the plaintiff was just as hurtful as if the writer
had been acquainted with the plaintiff and had in-
tentionally applied the charge to her. The law
looks to the tendency and consequences of a pub-
lication rather than to the intention of the pub-
lisher. It is generally said that malice is a
necessary element in libel, but that element is
present where the publication of a false charge is
Hatfield v. Printing Co., 103 Kan. 515.
15
made without a legal excuse. When the falsity of
the charge was concede, malice was established.
There is no excuse for a false charge or unchastity
and immorality which would be understood by reason-
able people to refer to plaintiff, and especially
where, as here, there is a lack of care and diligence
on the part of the publisher to ascertain the real
facts before the publication is made. One who makes
an untrue charge of the kind in question, whether
it is done recklessly or with care, does so at his
peril and takes the risk of liability for resulting
for injury. It has been held that "it is not a legal
excuse that defamatory matter was published acciden-
tally or inadvertently, or with good motives and in
an honest belief in its truth.
"
1
Identity of Person Libeled
Though a defamatory statement is published, a civil
libel is not committed upon an individual unless a suf-
ficient clue to his identity is given. It is not neces-
sary that the defamatory statement should refer to the
plaintiff by name. It is however sufficient to con-
stitute identity if the reasonable readers understand
that the defamatory words refer to the plaintiff.
On May 23, 1902, the Daily Traveler of Arkansas City
printed and published the following:
It is reported that Charlie Mclntire may soon
take charge of Greer's supplement. Charlie is all
right. In fact, anybody would be an improvement
on the eunuch who is snorting around in the base-
ment, but is unable to do anything else.
2
^-Hatfield v. Printing Co., 103 Kan. 515.
2Eckert v. VanPelt, 69 Kan. 35S.
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W. W. VanPelt, owner and proprietor of the Arkansas
City Enquirer, sued for libel.
The defendant argued that the newspaper article alleged
to be libelous did not contain the name of plaintiff, and
because there was no allegation that the public understood
the language used to refer to VanPelt.
Court decision:
. . . The omission of the name of a libeled person
in a publication concerning him does not deprive the
matter of its libelous character if it be alleged
and shown to whom the words used were intended to
apply. Whatever may have been the common-law rule,
it is not now necessary to allege, in order to state
a cause of action, that the public understood the
words printed to refer to the plaintiff. Section
4559, General Statutes of 1901, reads:
"In an action for libel or slander, it shall be
sufficient to state, generally, that the defamatory
matter was published or spoken of the plaintiff; and
if the allegation be denied, the plaintiff must prove
on the trial the facts showing that the defamatory
matter was published or spoken of him."
. . . There was testimony in the case tending
to show that persons who read the Daily Traveler un-
derstood the article to apply to plaintiff below.
One witness, Mr. Hess, testified without objection
that it was so understood generally. . .
. . . The verdict of $700 was sustained by
evidence, and the judgment of the court below will
be affirmed.
All the Justice concurring.
Defenses
Three complete defenses to actions for libel are:
(1) truth, (2) privileged communication with justifiable
1Eckert v. VanPelt, 69 Kan. 358.
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ends, (3) and fair comment and criticism. In addition,
there are two partial defenses (1) lack of malice and
(2) prompt retraction which might result in mitigation
of damages. All these defenses will be discussed in de-
tail in later chapters.
Time Limit on Suit
When a newspaper prints and publishes a defamatory
article, this article does not remain a perpetual target
at which the person defamed may launch a suit at any
future time. The time limit is fixed by the statute of
limitations. The Kansas statute reads:
Civil actions
. . . can only be brought within
the following periods.
Fourth—Within one year: An action for libel,...
But, by the act of the congress, approved March S,
1912, it is provided:
Sec. 205. That the period of military service
shall not be included in computing any period now
or hereafter to be limited by any law for the bringing
of any action by or against his heirs, executors,
administrations, or assigns, whether such cause of
action shall have been secured prior to or during
the period of such service. *
LLewis v. Publishing Co., Ill Kan. 653.
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CHAPTER III
LIBEL PER SE AND LIBEL PER QUOD
Libel Per Se
Nearly all civil libel suits brought against news-
papers, magazines, and other publications are based upon
statements that are known in legal terminology as libel
per se. Libel per se means that the statements are
libelous in themselves, or, in other words, "on their
faces." Justices of the Kansas Supreme Court have de-
fined libel per se accordingly:
Matter which is libelous per se is that
character of written or printed words so obviously
hurtful to the person aggrieved thereby that they
need no explanation of their meaning and no proof
of their injurious character .'
Defamatory words "actionable per se" are those
injurious character of which, read without innuendo,
in fact of common notoriety, established by consent
of men, to such
?
extent that courts take judicial
notice thereof.
Words actionable per se are words which in-
trinsically, without innuendo, import injury, and
are words from which damage, by consent of.men
generally, flows as a natural consequence.-'
1Jerald v. Houston, 120 Kan. 5.
o
Thompson v. Osawatomie Pub. Co., 159 Kan. 564.
^Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 318.
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Justice Price has summarized the points and made the
definition of libel per se more fully:
Words libelous per se are words which are de-
famatory in themselves and which extrinsically , by
their very use, without innuendo and the aid of
extrinsic proof, import injury and damage to the
person concerning whom they are written. They are
words from which malice is implied and damage is
conclusively presumed to result.
1
An individual will be sued for libel per se if he
publishes or causes the publication of an article which
falsely imputes a crime to another such as stating that
another has committed felony, ^ larceny, 3 or charging
another of being a blackmailer;^ or falsely accusing a
married woman of committing adultery is also actionable
per se.
But it is not necessary to charge some one in com-
mitting a crime or a woman unchaste to constitute libel
per se. The court has said:
Neither is it true that an article is not
libelous simply because the acts charged upon the
plaintiff are such as he might do without viola-
tion of any law. . . The law of libel is much
broader. In the third edition of 1 Hill. Torts,
p. 237, section 13, the author thus states the
law:
'Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 7#3
«
2Koontev. Weide, 111 Kan. 709.
^Garvin v. Garvin, 87 Kan. 97-
^•Hess v. Sparks, 44 Kan. 465-
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"So every publication, by writing, printing, or
painting, which charges or imputes to any person
that which. . . is calculated to make him infamous,
odious, or ridiculous, is prima facie a libel, and
implies malice in the publisher, without proof of
an intent to vilify.
^
To call a physician a quack in the headline of an
article, and conclude that he was a "blatant quack of un-
savory professional antecedents," harms him in his pro-
fession and trade is held to be libelous per se.^
To write of the officers of a corporation that no
one locally has any faith in their integrity or ability
does not state that those officers had committed a crime,
but the court held such a writing was actionable per se.
To charge an individual with improper conduct as a
political boss was libelous per se.
Newspaper articles, charging that the plaintiff as a
county attorney stated to the court that the applicant for
parole was a first offender, contrary to the fact, and
should be granted a parole, at the solicitation of the
applicant's attorneys and in subserviency to them, was
as charged as misconduct in office, and was libelous per
se.^
1Knapp v. Green, 123 Kan. 553.
2Brinkley v. Fishbein, 134 Kan. 833.
•^Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47.
TCnapp v. Green, 123 Kan. 550.
^Carver v. Greason, 101 Kan. 639.
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But it was not libelous per se to publish an article
stating a mayor that he had said, in reference to a matter
concerning which the law gave him discretion to act as he
saw fit, that he was running the town and the counsil and
people had nothing to do about it.
It was not libelous to publish in the newspaper a
notice that property had been stolen and offering a reward
for information leading to the conviction of the guilty
persons which referred to no particular person as guilty;
and it was not libelous if such an article contained no
ambiguous expression or insinuation even though persons
who were familiar with other facts understood to whom the
p
article referred.
However, the court ruled:
The language in writing is actionable per se
which denies "to a man the possession of some such
worthy quality as every man is a priori to be taken
to possess," or which tends "to bring a party into
public hatred or disgrace," or "to degrade him in
society," or expose him to "hatred, contempt, or
ridicule," or "which reflects upon his character,"
or "imputes something disgraceful to him," or
"throws contumely" on him, or "contumely and odium,"
or "tends to vilify him" or 'Injure his character,
or diminish his reputation," or which is "injurious
to his character," or to his "social character," or
shows him to be "immoral or ridiculous," or "induces
all ill opinion of him," or "detracts from his char-
acter as a man of good morals," or alters his "sit-
uation in society for the worse," or "imputes to him
Dever v. Montgomery S9 Kan. 637.
2
mueller v. Radebaugh, 79 Kan. 306.
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a bad reputation," or degradation of character," or
"ingratitude, " and "all defamatory words injurious
in their nature."-'-
When a publication is charged for libel per se, the
plaintiff is not required to allege damage in bringing suit,
nor is he required to prove damages in order to claim re-
covery. The law presumes that damage has been done, be-
cause the meaning of the words is such as to be understood
by society at large.
To have a clearer view of libel per se it is necessary
to review some of the cases in detail.
During the war with Germany, an article appeared in a
newspaper charging a person to be "slacker" under this
heading:
Deferred Man To Camp
Lewis of Attica Had a Friend Who
Got Him Off the Train—Now
He Must Go
The article narrated the futile effort of plain-
tiff to obtain deferred classification in the draft;
that when he was called to the military training
camp a friend succeeded in getting him off the train
and getting permission for him to return to his home.
It narrated a later investigation of plaintiff's case
before the local draft board, and that he made con-
tradictory affidavits to explain why he broke his
journey to the training camp; and told of a peremptory
order of the provost marshal directing that plaintiff
be summarily forwarded to Camp Funston. 2
1Eckert v. VanPelt, 69 Kan. 361.
2Lewis v. Publishing Co., Ill Kan. 257.
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The charges were not true and the plaintiff brought
suit against the newspaper.
Court decision:
The article was bound to render the plaintiff
contemptible as a slacker, and expose him to the
public as so lacking in patroitism in his country's
time of need that he would swear first to one thing
and then to another to avoid military service. There
can bo ne doubt, that the facts recited in the ar-
ticle, if false, were actionable.
1
An article was published which falsely accused a lawyer
abandoning his client in the midst of a litigation:
Ke (sterry) advised the (city) council that it
had the right to sink a well on the banks of the
Cottonwood river, adjacent to Soden's mill-dam, to
procure water for the use of the city, and draw all
the water it needed from the dam, and Soden could
not prevent it: and when Soden enjoined the city
from taking water out of the well or out of his
mill-pond, Mr. Sterry resigned as city attorney,
and left others to fight out the difficulty caused
by taking his advice, at a cost, as we are informed,
of §1,000 to the city of attorney's fees alone.
Had the (city) council been given proper advice
some time ago, it is most probable that the engine
and well of the water-works would not have been
located where they now are, and all the expense of
litigation, etc., now entailed upon the city by
that idiotic action would have been avoided. 2
The charges were not true and a libel suit was brought
against the publication.
Court decision:
. . .
We have not attempted to give the various
allegations of the petition in detail, but we think
we have stated the substance of enough to fully
Lewis v. Publishing Co., Ill Kan. 257.
2
Hetherington v. Sterry, Kan. 306.
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present the question for determination. On the part
of the defendant it is urged that the articles amount
to no more than a statement that the plaintiff erred
in his advice, and subsequently resigned the office
of city attorney; that it is not libelous to charge
an attorney with making a mistake in giving advice or
otherwise,—for attorneys, like all other persons,
are liable to mistakes; and that an officer has a
right to resign his office, and therefore to state
that he has done so is not libelous. On the other
hand, plaintiff contends that the articles charge
him with giving advice not merely mistaken and er-
roneous, but that which implies gross ignorance and
stupidity, and which led to action not inaccurately
characterized by defendant as idiotic; that while,
in a qualified sense, it is true that an officer may
resign his office at any time, or an attorney abandon
his client's cause at any time, yet that the resig-
nation of a city attorney pending important litiga-
tion on the part of the city is like the abandonment
by private counsel of his client in the middle of a
litigation, and that it is grossly unprofessional
for a lawyer to lead his client into difficulty, and,
when he has once gotten him into it, abandon him in
the midst of his trouble, and leave him to get out of
it as best he can. We agree in the main with the
views of plaintiff. It is not strictly true that
office is held purely at the pleasure of the incum-
bent. The public has rights as well as the office-
holder, and he may not abandon its duties at his own
pleasure. State v. Clayton, 27 Kan. 442. Neither
is it true that an article is not libelous simply
because the acts charged upon the plaintiff are such
as he might do without violation of any law. What-
ever might be the case as to slander, the law of libel
is much broader. In the third edition of 1 Hill.
Torts, p. 237, sec. 13, the author thus states the
law:
"So every publication, by writing, printing, or
painting, which charges or imputes to any person that
which renders him liable to punishment, or which is
calculated to make him infamous, odious, or ridiculous,
is prima facie a libel, and implies malice in the
publisher, without proof of an intent to vilify."
Nov;, we think it is unquestionably unprofessional
and dishonorable for a counsel to advise his client into
an illegal course of action, and after his client, in
pursuance of such advice, has gotten into difficulty
and litigation, then want only and unnecessarily to
abandon him and leave him so that he is obliged to
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employ extra counsel, at additional cost, to rescue
him from his trouble. We do not mean that a lawyer
may not abandon a litigation, even in medias res,
—
circumstances may sometimes justify or even compel
such conduct by the most honorable of men; but still
it is generally true that it is the counsel's duty
to stand by his client to the end; and unnecessary
abandonment of that client at the time when his
interests are in jeopardy, and especially when he
has been placed in such jeopardy by following the
advice of his counsel, is not only unprofessional,
but most always be deemed in the estimation of_good
citizens dishonorable and dishonest conduct. It
implies a breach of that confidence and trust which
every client has a right to repose in his counsel.
The lawyer who has the reputation of advising his
client into trouble, and then leaving him to get out
of it the best way he can, is one who would be shunned
by all prudent men in search of legal counsel and
assistance; and to charge a lawyer with such a course
of conduct is certainly calculated to make him in-
famous and odious in the sight of all. . •*
Another routine news item appeared in a newspaper as
follows
:
A second case was called late this afternoon, in
which John F. Hanson, of Marquette, is accused of
assult on M. A. Fosberg and Louise Fosberg. It is
claimed that in attempting to collect a bill he
threatened violence with a pistol. The latter parties
are the complaining witnesses. The decision of the
case will be announced later.
*
Hanson didn't like the article and sued for libel.
Court decision:
A libel, in order to be actionable per se, and
to permit a recovery without allegation and proof of
special damages, must contain imputations which tend
to subject the libeled one to disgrace, ridicule, or
contempt. We are of the opinion that the words here
complained of are such. To threaten violence with a
Hetherington v. Sterry, Kan. 306.
2Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670.
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pistol might fairly be held a sufficient charge, at
least, of an as suit, and possibly of a crime of
greater gravity
.
When a plaintiff sues a publication for libel per se,
he is not permitted to divide the article into separate and
isolated parts, or taking words or phrases out of context.
The Kansas Supreme Court, in the case of Jerald v. Houston,
124 Kan. 675, ruled that each statement must be considered
in connection with others, and the whole must be fairly
arid reasonably constructed. In other words, the tone and
tendency of the whole article must be considered in de-
termining whether or not the matter is libelous— single
words or phrases cannot be lifted from their context and
used as the basis for a libel action.
On August 2, 1959, advertisements containing the
Teamsters' letter together with a reply commenting upon
it were published in two Wichita newspapers. The reply
letter is as follows:
Is There Any Word for It But "Blackmail?"
Mr. and Mrs. Citizen:
At least six large trucking firms in Wichita are
being picketed yet there is no strike, no contract
negotiations, no nothing— except blackmail!
What is happening in Wichita is in open disregard
of the Kansas Right to Work law; another example of
Hoffaism and the tactics of the puppet leaders who do
Hoffa's bidding.
•'-Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670.
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The picketing in Wichita began after a letter from
Sam Smith, local Teamster boss, was sent to the truck
line operators. (Smith's letter is reproduced at the
right.) It is doubtful if such a letter has ever be-
fore been seen in the long history of union boss at-
tempts to deprive American working people of their
freedom of choice—and force them to join unions or
lose their means of livelihood.
In absolute disregard of either employer or
employee rights and wishes, Sam Smith's letter com-
bines the work of the skilled writer and the in-
genuity of the legal practitioner. Lest the full
meaning of this letter be lost in its lengthy word-
age, this is what the union boss is saying to the
Wichita trucking firms:
"We know the law, and the law says we can picket
you as an exercise of free speech so long as we do it
peacefully.
"We know, also, that our picket at your door will
put you out of business because you will not be able
to move goods so long as our picket is there.
"We are under no necessity to sell the union to
your employees because you will compel them to join
our membership as quickly as the picketing shoe
starts to pinch.
"There is no occasion for us to use force and
violence and risk possible injunction proceedings
against us because you, Mr. Employer, will do our
job for us. You'll have to—or go out of business.
"We don't care, either, for the supposed con-
titutional or moral rights of your employees. They
lost their rights when the lawmakers and the courts
ceased to protect them and delivered their economic
destiny into our hands."
Picketing is a simple device. One two-dollar-a-
day stranger carrying a picket sign for some union can
literally stop business—any business;— in its tracks.
If continued, it can destroy the business against
which it is directed.
Picketing, as a means of advertising a legitimate
labor dispute between employer and employee, is an
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acceptable device to most Americans. Even used to
effect the ends of a private organization which seeks
only its own purpose without regard for the conse-
quences to both employer and employee, it is a monster.
This monster, Mr. and Mrs. Wichita can within a
few days stop your flow of food, medicine and other
vital necessities of everyday life. It can paralyze
the City of Wichita, all the surrounding area, the
State of Kansas—even spread throughout the nation.
This monster can also throw thousands of people
out of work, including regular rank and file members
of the Teamsters- who want no part of Sam Smith's
action, who desire only to work and earn a living
for themselves, their wives and their children.
Let it be known that the Sam Smith letter did
not originate with Sam Smith. The same identical
letter, word for word, was sent more than two months
ago to Chicago trucking companies by Teamsters Local
710 in that city.
Also, let it be known that if Sam Smith wants to
fight the Right to V.'ork battle all over again, Kansans
for the Right to Work is ready to go.
Our organization is offering every resource at
its command to those trucking firm employees who need
and want our help. Public pressure must be brought
to bear on Sam Smith through a flood of protests
directed at him by open personal appeals to Governor
Docking, the city manager and the mayor of Wichita
—
and through pledges of unqualified support to the
trucking firm operators and their embattled office
and clerical employees.
Every member and friend of the Right to Work
movement— every citizen who believes in personal
freedom and who wants to protect himself and his
family—is urged to act at once—by telephone,
telegram, letter or personal calls—to force a halt
to this type of blackmail picketing which is being
used as a ganster gun in the ribs of business and its
employees
.
Kansans for the Right to Work
P. 0. Box 3038, S. E. Station Wichita1
Local Union No. 795 v. Kansans for the Right to Work,
189 Kan. 118.
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As a result of this publication, the Local Union No.
795 brought suit against the Kansans for the Right to Work,
a corporation, on reasons that the advertisement accused
plaintiff of engaging in blackmail (a crime in Kansas), of
lacking morals and failing to respect the moral rights of
others, of coercing employees contrary to state and federal
laws, of engaging in "blackmail picketing," of making use
of a "gangster's gun," and of violating other laws, all of
which charges tended to make the plaintiff contemptible,
infamous, odious and ridiculous. The defendant challenged
the sufficiency of the petitions but his demurrers were
overruled by the trial court. The case was brought to the
Supreme Court for review and the court's opinion were as
follows
:
... In connection with the court's duty it
generally is held that in determining whether a
writing or utterance is defamatory per se each part
thereof must be considered in its relation to the
others rather than separately. In other words, the
entire statement must be fairly and reasonably con-
struced as a whole. . . Closely related to and
actually a part of the forgoing principle of inter-
pretation is the rule that words or phrases must not
be taken out of context. The rule has its roots
in justice. Words, which standing alone, would be
actionable may not be so when taken in connection
with their context. . .
The term "Blackmail picketing" was an infant
term just coming to usage and not fully developed
at the time of the publication herein. Dictionary
definitions of the term were not available. To
organized labor this third party type of peaceful
picketing was an effective useful weapon, allegedly
within the law. To the right to work group it posed
a dangerous threat and the term "blackmail picketing"
was catching hold to describe it. (See the discussion
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in Newell v. Local Union 795, supra, beginning at
page 909.) The term "blackmail'' as used in the
article published, when read in context with the
whole publication, was clearly a part of the new
term "blackmail picketing."
The term "gangster gun" when read in context is
clearly a figure .of speech with a significance en-
tirely distinct from the true meaning of the term
if used in isolation. Citizens were urged to act
at once "to force a halt to this type of blackmail
picketing which is being used as a gangster gun in
the ribs of business and its employees." (Emphasis
added. ) Obviously, the picketing described is not
a gun and a business does not have ribs. The terms
employed to describe how such picketing was being
used were thus figures of speech having an entirely
different connotation than the true meaning of the
words when isolated and defined.
While the terms "blackmail" and "blackmailer,"
when used against a person to mean that such person
committed the offense of extortion, have been held
sufficient to sustain an action for libel per se,
the circumstances here presented are different and
we have a different type of publication. Here the
publication itself clearly defines the meaning of
the term "blackmail picketing" which the reader may
readily grasp by reading both the letter and the
comments thereon.
Whether, the Teamsters care or do not care what
the employees of the trucking firms think or want, or
for their supposed constitutional or moral rights
(See Paragraphs VIII and IX of the petition) is not
a crime under either state or federal law. These
comments are not reasonably susceptiable of con-
stituting libel per se. . .
In conclusion we hold the lower court erred in
overruling the appellants' demurrer to the petition.
The judgment is reversed. *
lLocal Union No. 795 v. Kansans for the Right to Work,
189 Kan. 118.
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Libel Per Quod
The Supreme Court of Kansas has defined libel per quod
as follows
:
Words libelous per quod are words ordinarily
not defamatory, that is, they are words the injur-
ious character of which appears only in consequence
of extrinsic facts and which become actionable only
when special damage is proved. Thus, words not de-
famatory per se may become actionable per quod, de-
pending upon the facts and circumstances of the
particular case.
Under certain circumstances, it is possible through a
publication to injure an individual even though the lan-
guage in itself is not libelous per se. This type of libel
is known as libel per quod. In this type of case, the
circumstances that surround the incident or its publication
make it damaging and therefore libelous rather than do the
words themselves or their meaning. The words themselves,
indeed, published under other circumstances, might not be
libelous at all.
In case of libel per quod, the injured person must prove
that the circumstances attending the publication or the in-
nuendo have caused him damage. In order to recover, the in-
jured person must allege the damage he suffered and the
amount of it and prove the loss in the trial of the case.
Concerning these points, the Supreme Court has said:
Certain words, all admit, are in themselves
actionable, because the natural consequence of
Karrigan v. Valentine, I84 Kan. 7#3.
what they impute to the party is damage, as if they
import a charge that the party has been guilty of a
criminal offense involving moral turpitude, or that
the aarty is infected with a contagious distemper,
or if they are prejudicial in a pecuniary sense to
a person in office or to a person engaged as a live-
lihood in a profession or trade; but in all other
cases the party who brings an action for words must
show the damage he or she has suffered by the false
speaking of the other party. L
The same court added the following explanation in the
case of Koerner v. Lawler:
Words actionable per quod are those whose in-
jurious effect must be established by due allegation
and proof, and in order to state a cause of action
for libel or slander per quod, as distinguished from
libel or slander per se, the special damage or damages
resulting therefrom must be alleged, a mere general
allegation of damages being insufficient. Furthermore,
with reference to the sufficiency of allegations as
to libel involving a profession or trade, the rule is
that one suing for libel on account of words directly
tending to injure or prejudice his reputation in his
profession or trade must allege and prove that he
carried on such profession or trade when the words
were published, and that they were used in reference
to his conduct therein. 2
It is clear that the words "libelous per quod" are words
ordinarily not defamatory but which become actionable when
special damages are shown. No recovery will be granted if
the plaintiff can set forth only the special surrounding
circumstances which prove that the words, innocent on their
face, are defamatory. Therefore, cases of libel per quod
are far less numerous than cases of libel per se. The
1Bennett v. Seimiller, 175 Kan. 767.
2Koerner v. Lawler, 180 Kan. 322.
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following is a case in which the plaintiff sued for libel
per se. But after reviewing the case, the Supreme Court
ruled that it was a case of libel per quod, and because no
special damage was pleaded and proved, it was dismissed.
The defendants, on November 3, 1956, published in the
Clay Center Dispatch the followings:
Stork-O-Grams. Ellen Marie is the name Mr. and
Mrs. Phillip Karrigan of Clay Center gave to their
daughter, who was born Thursday, Nov. 1, at the Clay
County Hospital. The little girl weighed nine pounds,
three ounces.
The Karrigans have two other children, Gary, 7
and Timothy, 3-
Grandparents are Mr. and Mrs. E. H. Carpenter of
Lovell, V/yo. Great grandparents are Mrs. Ida Davis
of Clay Center and Mrs. Kate Carpenter of Onaha,
Nebraska.
This article was not true. Karrigan, a bachelor,
brought libel suit on the ground that Betty Ellen Carpenter,
the woman the newspaper said that the plaintiff was married
to, was of ill repute and that she had given birth to four
children out of wedlock, and that the announcement was
falsely and maliciously constructed by the defendant.
Court decision:
. . . Standing alone, the article contains nothing
of a defamatory or derogatory nature, and merely follows
the pattern of the usual and common birth-announcement
notices carried in newspapers. It does not accuse
plaintiff of crime or immoral or reprehensible conduct
of any kind. To the reader it is a routine announce-
ment of the legitimate birth of a child in the local
community. Without stating a cause of action for libel
J-Karrigan v. Valentine, 184 Kan. 733.
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per se, and as to such count defendants' demurrer was
properly sustained. . .
Determination of this question (libel per quod)
depends upon whether plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded
special damage and injury to him resulting from the
publication. While it is true that plaintiff has not
alleged special damage to his trade, profession, or
business—if he is so engaged—we think it would be
incorrect to hold that recovery in an action for libel
per quod is restricted and limited merely to damage
of that nature. In other words, pecuniary loss to
one's trade, profession or business should not be
the sole test in a case of this kind. The article
in question being non-defamatory on its face, plain-
tiff, in order to state a cause of action for libel
per quod, was required to allege explanatory extrinsic
facts in connection with the subject of the article
and the resulting special damage and injury to him. . .
Of a certainty, libel per quod cannot be created
out of thin air, and in order to support a recovery
evidence of the damage and injury resulting must be
definite and substantial, not fictitious or imaginary.
It may be that plaintiff will be unable to prove his
allegations, including those as to special damage to
him.
. .
. . . Nevertheless, after a most careful study
of the petition, we are contrained to hold that, in
view of all the facts and circumstances pleaded, it
may not be said that count two thereof fails to state
a cause of action for libel per quod. . .
The result, therefore, is this:
Count one of the petition fails to state a cause
of action for libel per se, and as to it the demurrer
was properly sustained. Count two of the petition
states a cause of action for libel per quod, and as to
it the demurrer was erroneously sustained. •*
Innuendo
Very often, innuendo will be needed in cases of libel
per quod. The purpose of an innuendo is to define the
xKarrigan v. Valentine, 1&1+ Kan. 783.
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defamatory meaning which the plaintiff seeks to put upon
the words complained of, to show how they come to have the
defamatory meaning claimed for them and also to show how
they relate to the plaintiff, whenever that relationship
is not clear upon the face of them. If an innuendo is used
to explain the meaning of words employed, it must not add
to or restrict the obvious and natural meaning of the pub-
lished words.
A routine story published in the Salina Evening Journal:
Hanson was one of the attorneys in the Linderholm
case, and in closing up the estate it became necessary
that Mr. Hanson should tell what had become of certain
funds. Mr. Hanson refused to make any explanation to
the probate court , and the court ordered him to jail
for contempt .1
Hanson sued the newspaper for libel. By an innuendo he
alleged that the newspaper intended to charge him as being
guilty of the crime of embezzlement and of unprofessional
conduct
.
Court decision:
The statement cannot be made to appear libelous
by an innuendo alleging that it was thereby intended
to charge that plaintiff was guilty of the crime of
embezzlement and of unprofessional conduct. If the
statement as published had been true there might have
been many proper and valid reasons why he refused to
make an explanation to the court without his being
guilty of embezzlement. It is not even asserted that
the funds of the estate, or any part of them, ever
came into his hands, but merely that he refused to
make any explanation. The office of the innuendo is
not to charge or restrict the natural meaning of the
1Kanson v. Bristow 37 Kan. 72.
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words. It cannot enlarge ambiguous words, not neces-
sarily of themselves importing crime, beyond the
averment of the speaker's intention. If the publi-
cation is not actionable per se, it cannot be made
so by an innuendo. . ,^-
^Kanson v. Bristow, £7 Kan. 72.
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CHAPTER IV
CRIMINAL LIBEL
Libel is criminal wrong as well as a civil tort. Civil
libel arises from a tort done to an individual who sues to
recover damages. Criminal libel arises from a wrong done
to state or society, resulting in a breach of the peace.
In order to punish the person, the state sues for libel.
But the suit does not necessarily result in an actual
breach of the peace. It is sufficient if the defamatory
publication has a tendency to cause the person or persons
libeled to break the peace.
Penalty for criminal libel may be a fine or an im-
prisonment, or both.
It is somewhat difficult to draw a sharp distinction
between civil and criminal libel. Any libel that has ground
for a civil suit also has ground for a criminal prosecu-
tion. However, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in the case of
the State v. Huff, stated that the controlling question for
a criminal prosecution was whether the information stated
that there was a public offense. Thus, words charging an
editor of being intoxicated on several occasions and that,
1The State v. Osborn, 54 Kan. 480.
2The State v. Huff, 96 Kan. 634.
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too, after he had been elected to the legislature as the
champion of prohibition were libelous and the publishers
were prosecuted criminally.
An article was published in the Osage County Democrat,
a newspaper of the city of Burlingame. The article read as
follows:
Characteristic of Him.—The sneaking innuendo
thrown out by the Chronicle last week at ex-Gov.
Robinson and Col. Glick, is characteristic of the
hypocritical puppy who wrote it. Both gentlemen
alluded to by our subterranean contemporary are too
well known and too highly esteemed to be affected by
cowardly insinuations coming from a source so notor-
iously unreliable as the Chronicle. Coarse insinua-
tion is the favorite weapon of the poltroon, and this
accounts for the constabulary organ's use of it.
Upon assuming editorial management of this paper
we mentally resolved never to indulge in personalities,
except for the purpose of exposing wrong, or subserv-
ing the ends of justice, and consider it no violation
of our rule when we state that the editor of the
Chronicle has been intoxicated on several occasions,
and that, too, after he was elected to the legislature
as the champion of prohibition. We have evidence in
our possession of the truth of the above statement;
and give it to the public that they may know what
kind of a creature it is that indulges in covert
insinuations against such men as Gov. Robinson and
Col. Glick, and the large and (with the exception of
Rastall and a few kindred spirits) respectable audience
that gave them such a hearty greeting. 1
As a result of the publication of this article, Jame
Mayberry and June B. Mayberry were charged with the offense
of libeling John E. Rastall. They were convicted by the
lower trial court and were sentenced to pay a fine of $25
each, and also the costs of using the court. They excepted
1The State v. Mayberry, 33 Kan. 442.
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against the ruling and appealed to the Supreme Court on
reasons that the article did not state facts sufficient to
constitute a public offense and that "the facts if properly
averred or stated, are insufficient to constitute a libel."
Court decision:
... We also think that the matter contained in
the article, if false and malicious, as is alleged in
the information, is libelous. The article charges
"that the editor of the Chronicle has been intoxicated
on several occasions, and that, too, after he was
elected to the legistature as the champion of pro-
hibition," and the article also uses many epithets
in connection with the above charge, "tending to
provoke him to wrath, or expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule, or to deprive him of the bene-
fits of public confidence or social intercourse." . . .
The ruling for the above case did not give much help in
determining the distinction between civil and criminal cases.
Any libel tending to cause a public offense may bring a
criminal charge of libel—and it is the nature of all libel
to do just that. However, criminal libel may take care of
those areas in which a civil suit cannot be brought: libel
of the dead, libel of a member of the family, a sect or a
group too large to enable any individual member of the group
to sue for damages. This statement was published in the
Salina Daily Republican:
'Tis now almost forgotten that Governor Harvey
pardoned his own brother out of the penitentiary; the
convict Harvey had been sent to Lansing from Salina.
3
1Ibid.
2Ibid.
3 State v. Brandy, 44 Kan. 435.
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The statement was not true and a criminal libel suit
brought in the name of the state. Commissioner Green spoke
.for the Supreme Court as follows:
In this case the alleged libel charged that
"Governor Harvey had pardoned his own brother out of the
penitentiary; that the convict Harvey had been sent to
Lansing from Salina. This was certainly charging that
one of the Harvey brothers had been convicted of a
felony, and comes clearly within the definition of
libel, as defined by the crimes act:
"A libel is the malicious defamation of a person,
made public by any printing, writing, sign, picture,
representation or effigy, tending to provoke him to
wrath, or expose him to public hatred, confidence and
social intercourse, or any malicious defamation, made
public as aforesaid, designed to scandalize or pro-
voke his surviving relatives and friends."
To call a person a returned convict, or otherwise
to falsely impute that he has been tried and convicted
of a criminal offense, is actionable. . .
. .
. The appellant again contends that the state-
ment published referred to no particular one of the
Harvey family as having been a prison convict. While
this objection might be urged with some force in a
civil suit for damages, we do not think it is good in
a criminal prosecution for libel. The law is elemen-
tary that a libel need not be on a particular person,
but may be upon a family or a class of persons, if the
tendency of the publication is to stir up riot and dis-
order, and incite to a breach of the peace.
A scandal published of three or four, or any one
or two persons , is punishable at the complaint of one
or more, or all of them. In Palmer v. City of Concord
the supreme court said:
"As these charges were made against a body of men,
without specifying individuals, it may be that no indi-
vidual soldier could have maintained a private action
therefore; but the question whether the publication
might not afford ground for a public prosecution is
entirely different. Civil suits for libel are main-
tainable only or. the ground that the plaintiff has
individually suffered damage. Indictments for libel
are sustained principally because the publication of
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libel tends to a breach of the peace, and thus to the
disturbance of society at large. It is obvious that
a libelous attack on a body of men, though no individ-
uals be pointed out, may tend as much or more to create
public distrubance as an attack on one individual; and
a doubt has been suggested whether the fact of numbers
does not add to the enormity of the act. . ."
It is not necessary, to render an act malicious,
that the party be actuated by a feeling of hatred or
ill-will toward the individual, or that he entertain
the pursue any general bad purpose or design. On the
contrary, he may be actuated by a general good purpose,
and have a real and sincere design to bring about a
reformation of matters; but if in pursuing that design
he wilfully inflicts a wrong on others which is not
warranted by law, such act is malicious.
The want of actual intent to vilify is no excuse
for a libel; and if a man deems that to be right which
the law pronounces wrong, the mistake does not free
him of guilt.
1
In addition, in civil libel, to form "publication" it
is necessary to show the defamatory matter to some person
other than the person defamed. But in criminal libel, it
is enough to form "publication" only to show the defamatory
matter to the person defamed.
Truth for which is a complete defense in civil libel
does not serve as a ready defense in criminal libel. Such
defense may be introduced for mitigation of damages. Most
of the states, in addition to truth, require that it be
accompanied by good motive and justifiable ends. This re-
quirement is so written in the statute of Kansas. The
statute reads:
State v. Brandy, 44 Kan. 435-
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In all prosecutions on indictments for libels
the truth thereof may be given in evidence to the
jury, and if it appears to them that the matter as
charged as libelous was true, and was published with
good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendant
shall be acquitted.
This additional- requirement was ruled invalid by the
Supreme Court of Kansas because it voilated section 11 of
the Bill of Right which reads:
In all civil or criminal cases for libel the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury, and if it shall
appear that the alleged libelous matter was published
for justifiable ends, the accused party shall be ac-
quitted.
In ruling the case the court said:
The legislature had no power to place upon the
defendant, in making out a justification the additional
burden of showing that the publication was made with
good motives. When he was given the truth in evidence,
and has made it appear that the alleged libelous matter
was published for justifiable ends, he is entitled to
an acquittal. So far then, as the statute differs
from the constitution, it must be held invalid, and
the instruction of the court making good motives in
the publication a prerequisite to a justification must
be held erroneous.
1
The fact that criminal libel covers a greater territory
and has less limitation for law suit does not mean that there
are more criminal prosecutions for libel. Criminal prosecu-
tions of libel are very rare. Most proceedings are begun by
individuals who have been defamed. The purposes of the law
concerning criminal libel are well stated by Justice Cowing
in a New York case as follows:
•'State v. Verry, 36 Kan. 416.
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A criminal libel is prosecuted in the name of the
people, not for the purpose of redressing an injury
done to an individual, but is so prosecuted and pun-
ished as a crime for the reason that it tends to pro-
voke animosity and violence, and to disturb the public
peace and repose, and certainly it will not be for a
moment contended that the threatened danger to the
public peace is not as great when the person libeled
is a bad man as when he is a good man. In a civil
action, brought by an individual to obtain satisfac-
tion for an injury to his reputation, caused by the
publication of a libel, the bad reputation of the
complainant becomes material as affecting the measure
of damages, while in a criminal action brought in the
name of the people the individual libeled, so far as
personal redress and satisfaction are concerned, is
not considered. (People v. Stokes, New York, 1893;
30 Abb.N.C. 200; 24 K.T.S. 727-
J
1
'•Arthur and Crosman, op. cit., p. 206.
44
CHAPTER V
DAMAGES
Damages resulting from libelous publications are
classified generally under these headings: (1) compen-
satory damages
—
general and special, (2) punitive damages,
and (3) nominal damages.
Compensatory damages embrace general and special
damages. General damages arise from injury to reputation
and hurt feelings and mental anguish. If the defamatory
statement is libelous per se, general damages may be a-
warded without proving of injury or actual damages.
General damages, ruled the Kansas Supreme
Court, are those which the law presumes must na-
turally, proximately and necessarily result from
the publication of the libelous matter. They a-
riseby inference of law and are not required to be
proved by evidence. They are allowable whenever the
immediate tendency of the words is to impair the
plaintiff's reputation, although no actual pecuniary
loss has, in fact, resulted, and are designed to
compensate for that large and substantial class of
injuries arising from injured feelings , mental suf-
fering and anguish, and personal and public humil-
iation, consequent upon the malicious publication of
false and libelous matter. The injuries for which
this class of damages is allowed are something more
than merely speculative. While not susceptible of
being accurately measured in dollars and cents, they
are real injuries, and often more substantial and
real than those designated as actual, and measured
accurately by the dollar standard. In short, they
1Hatfield v. Printing Co., 103 Kan. 513; and also
Hanson v. Krehbiel, 63 Kan. 670.
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are such injuries to the reputation as were contem-
plated in the bill of rights. The law presumes that
this class of injuries results necessarily from the
publication of the libelous matter, and the damages, ,
therefore, are recoverable without special assignment.
In the case of Roniger v. Mcintosh, the plaintiff sued
for libel which was based upon a letter written by the de-
fendant which referred to plaintiff as follows:
Elmdale, Kansas, April 5, 1912.
Mr. Randolph
Dear Sir: As I have never met you, you may
think I am impolite in writing to you; but, as you
know, Fred Roniger lived in my house, and raised
life stock; came here and represented himself to a
farmer and all— ''round stock man, but I found him
no good for anything, only torturing stock. He
could not do anything like a farmer. Could not
plow a row of corn, if he got ten dollars for it.
But I found he could steal a good lick. I wrote
him yesterday, but I am of the opinion that he
will not answer. If so, I will send for him.
I am in awful poor health, and not in shape to be
annoyed by thieves. . .
William Mcintosh. 2
In the trial, the plaintiff did not plead or try to
prove any actual damages. The court explained:
This was not necessary, because the letter con-
tained statements that were libelous per se, and the
court rightly instructed the jury that the amount of
the plaintiff's recovery should be left to their good
sense and fair judgment.-'
•"•Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670.
2
'•Roniger v. Mcintosh, 91 Kan. 370.
3 lbid.
kt
In another case the court ruled that general damages
from a false publication charging a woman with unchastity
arise by inference of the law, and need not be proof.
Special damages are such damages as can be shown and
compute- in »:.rms of money. Sometimes, the individual
libeled may not suffer from general damages; that is, the
natural consequence of a publication may not injure his
reputation and his feelings and cause him mental anguish.
But he may, nevertheless, suffer some other losses such as
his property, business, trade, profession or occupation.
In this case, he has grounds to launch a suit for libel and
recovery if he can show and prove the damages at the trial.
Special damages, the court ruled, also re-
coverable when properly pleaded and shown, are such
damages as are computable in money, and may be said
fairly to be embraced in the list of actual damages,
as given in the statute referred to.
Section 2 of the statute says:
The words "actual damages" . . . shall be con-
structed to include all damages which the plaintiff shall
show he has suffered in respect to his property, bus-
iness, trade, profession, or occupation, and no other
damages whatever
.
Punitive damages, also called exemplary damages, are
damages awarded the person libeled as punishment and deter-
rent upon the libeler so that he will not repeat the offense,
and to serve as a warning to others. Where punitive damages
are asked fcr, the plaintiff must prove that the publication
has been actuated by expressed, as distinguished from implied,
xHatfield v. Gazette Printing Co., 103 Kan. 513.
2Hanson v. Krehbiel, 63 Kan. 670.
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malice or bad motive. To this point, the court has said:
Whether punitive damages are awarded or not
has no influence on the verdict of the actual damages.
In fact , the finding that actual damages are sustained
from publication of defamatory for punitive damages,
if the statement is actuated by malice.
1
The amount of punitive damages that may be awarded is
by no means affected by the amount of general damages given.
In a recent case in New York, a judgment for $1 general
damages and of $175,000 for punitive damages against the
defendants was sustained.
Nominal" damages are awarded in one of the two con-
ditions. If from all the circumstantial evidence concern-
ing the case, it appears that the defendant is guilty of
the charge, but that the plaintiff has not been altogether
blameless, the jury by way of mitigation reduces the amount
to a mere nominal sum. Where no special damage is pleaded,
no general damages proved, no exemplary damages allowed by
the jury, then the jury should allow nominal damages to the
plaintiff
.
3
Other Matters Affecting Damages
If the publishers who are defendants in a libel suit
are unable to show that the defamatory publication is true,
that it is privileged, or that it is fair comment and
%inans v. Chapman, 104 Kan. 665.
2Nizer, Louis, My Life in Court , New York: Pyramid
Publications, Inc., 1963, p. 168.
^Miles v. Harrington, 8 Kan. 284.
43
criticism, then the injured plaintiff is entitled to a
verdict of a certain amount. Kow small this sum shall be
depend upon how good a case the defendants can make out in
mitigation of damages. The range of defenses that may be
interposed for this purpose is very broad; however, their
very end is to prove the lack of malice.
It is true that malice is an important element in libel
suits. Malice is either in law or in fact. Malice in law
is the kind of malice which is shown by the disregard of the
rights of the person libeled without legal justification.
In cases of libel per se malice in law is presumed to exist.
Malice in fact is the kind of malice which springs from ill
will, bad motive, evil purpose, or hatred, and a desire to
injure the person about whom the defamatory statement is
published.
To prove that the defamatory publication is lack of
malice means that it is lack of malice in fact. Success
in doing so will result in mitigation of damages. The
following cases are some examples of the possible ways to
prove absence of malice:
(1) To show that the article was written with great
care, that all reasonable caution had been used in obtaining
information, and that it expressed no malice against the in-
jured person.
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(2) To show that the general conduct of the plaintiff
was such that it gave the defendant "probable cause" for
believing the charge to be true.
(3) To show that rumors to the same effect as those
of the libelous publication were current for a long time and
that the plaintiff did not take the trouble to contradict
them.
(4) To show that the plaintiff's general reputation in
the community is bad and that he has no reputation left to
be injured.
(5) To show that the. article came from a reliable
source and was believed to be true.
(6) To show that the same article was carried by other
publications.
(7) To show that a prompt retraction, apology, or
correction was published as soon as the defendants had
discovered the mistake.
As stated above, an apology or a retraction will not act
as a substitute for damages; it will serve to show lack of
malice which may reduce, and perhaps eliminate entirely, the
item of punitive damages. 1 However, concerning retraction,
the General Statute of Kansas states that a full, fair, and
prompt retraction may release the defendants from all liabil-
ity except actual damages. The statute reads:
^•Koontz v. Weide, 111 Kan. 709.
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Section 1. That before any civil action shall be
brought for the publication or circulation of a libel
in any newspaper in this state, the plaintiff shall,
at least three days before filing the petition in such '
action, serve notice on the publisher or publishers of
such newspaper, at the principal office of publication,
specifying the statement in said article which is al-
leged to be false or defamatory. If it shall appear
or. the trial of such action that said article was pub-
lished in good faith, that its falsity was due to mis-
take or misapprehension of the facts, and that a full
and fair retraction of any statement therein contained
alleged to be erroneous was published in the next is-
sue of said newspaper, if a weekly or monthly, or, in
case of a daily paper, within three days after such
mistake or misapprehension was brought to the know-
ledge of such publisher or publishers, in as conspic-
uous a place and type in such newspaper as was the
article complained of as libelous, then the plaintiff
in such case shall recover only actual damages; pro-
vided, that the provisions of this act shall not apply
to the case of any libel against any candidate for* a
public office in this state unless the retraction is
made editorially, in a conspicuous manner, at least
ten days before election, in case such libelous ar-
ticle was published in a daily paper, and in case
such libelous article was published in weekly or
monthly paper, at least fifteen days before the
election; provided further, that nothing in this act
shall be held to apply to any libel published of or
concerning any female person
.
Justice Cunningham spoke for the court and held this
statute unconstitutional. His opinions are as follows:
This is assailed as being violative of section
18 of the bill of rights, which reads:
"All persons, for injuries suffered in person,
reputation or property, shall have remedy by due
course of law, and justice administered without de-
lay."
It will be noted that the statute questioned limits
the right of recovery in cases of libel to actual dam-
ages where, after service of the notice provided in the
first section, the publisher of the newspaper in which
1-Hanson v. Krehbiel, 68 Kan. 670.
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the libelous matter has appeared makes a full and fair
retraction, coupled with under a misapprehension of
the facts. This statute also declares that class of
damages to be such as the plaintiff has suffered in
respect to his property, business, trade, profession,
or occupation. So that, in such cases, the libeled
party may not recover all his damage, but is confined
to the narrow class defined and designated in the act
as actual damages. . .
It requires no argument to demonstrate that the
act in question denies a remedy for some of these
injuries. Unless the one libeled has suffered in
the particular manner pointed out in the statute, he
is without remedy. For that large class of persons
and still larger class of injuries not falling within
the provisions of this statute, no remedy is found.
From the writings of the world's wisest man we have
the assurance that "a good name is rather to be chosen
than great riches;" yet the prossessor of the thing
of greatest value, being despoiled of it, is left by
the statute in question entirely without remedy for
its loss, except in such rare cases where he may be
able to show some exact financial injury in the
particulars named. We could not excuse ourselves for
holding that reputation is less valuable that property,
or that by the quoted provision of the bill of rights
it is less protected from spoliation.
It is suggested that the retraction required by
the act to be published is a fair compensation for the
injury done , and a reinvestment of the libeled one with
his good name; that, this being done, nothing more
could be accomplished by a verdict of a jury, and
hence, that the retraction required by the legislative
enactment, if not "due course of law," is an ample
substitute for it
.
The retraction required by the act in question
may or may not be full reparation for the injury suf-
fered. It might rather aggravate the injury already
inflicted than mollify it. It is sufficient to say,
however, that these are all questions for the courts,
upon proper notice to all parties, and may not be
determined arbitrarily by an act of the legislature.
We. find that the constitutionality of acts like the
one here discussed. In Park v. Free Press Co., 72
Mich. 560, 565, 40 N.W. 731, 16 Am. St. Rep. 544, 1
L.R.A. 599, the supreme court of Michigan, holding
against the constitutionality, said:
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"We do not think the statute controls the action,
or is within the power of constitutional legislation.
This will, in our judgment, appear from a statement
of its effect if carried out. It purports to confine
recovery in certain cases against newspapers to what
it calls 'actual damages,' and then defines actual
damages to cover only direct pecuniary loss in certain
specified ways, and none other. In some of these de-
fined cases the proof of any damages in this sense
would be impracticable, and in all it would be very
difficult. They are confined to damages in respect
to property, business, trade, profession or occupation.
It is safe to say that such losses cannot be the true
damage in a very large share of the worst cases of
libel. A woman who is slandered in her chastity is
under thisiaw usually without any redress whatever.
A man whose income is from fixed investment or salary
or official emolument, or business not depending upon
his repute, could lose no money directly unless re-
moved from the title to receive his income by reason
of the libel, which could seldom happen. If contra-
dicted soon, there could be practically no risk of
this. And the same is true concerning most business
losses. The cases must be very rare in which a libel
will destroy business profits in such a way that the
loss can be directly traced to the mischief. There
could never be any loss when employers or customers
know or believe the charge unfounded. The statute
does not reach cases where a libel has operated to
cut, off chances of office or employment in the future,
or broken up or prevented relationships not capable
of an exact money standard, or produced that intangible
but fatal influence which suspicion, helped by ill
will, spreads beyond recall or reach by apology or
retraction. Exploded lies are continually reproduced
without the antidote, and no one can measure with any
accurate standard the precise amount of evil done or
probable.
"There is no room for holding, in a constitutional
system, that private reputation is any more subject to
be removed by statute from full legal protection than
life, liberty, or property. It is one of those rights
necessary to human society that underlie the whole
social scheme of civilization. It is a thing which
is more easily injured than restored, and where injury
is capable of infinite mischief."
This case was subsequently specifically approved
by the same court in McGee v. Baumgartner , 121 Mich.
287, oO N.W. 21, where the court said:
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"The right to recover in an action of libel for
damages to reputation cannot be abridged by statute."
A contrary view was adopted by a divided court
in Allen v. Pioneer Press Co
., 40 Minn. 117, 41 N.W.
936, 12 Am St. Rep. 707, 3 L.R.A. 532. The conclusion
of the court in this case is based largely upon the
reasoning that the retraction, being required to be
published as widely and to substantially the same
readers as the original, is usually a more complete
redress for the injury inflicted than a judgment
for damages would be. This, however, is merely an
assumption, and may or may not be true; but even if
true, it would not be a "remedy by due course of law,"
as contemplated in the constitution, as we have al-
ready determined. We are well persuaded that the
right of remedy by due course of law for an injury
suffered in his reputation, and, hence, is invalid,
under the constitutional provision quoted. ^
Amount of Damages That May Be Awarded
In a case in which two persons were candidates for a
public office, and one publicly proclaimed the other to be
a "thief," and "embezzles," "dishonest," "crooked," and the
like, and the jury found that such statements were not made
in good faith, the court ruled that a verdict awarding
damages in the sum of $1,500 to the slanderous person
o
could not be considered as excessive.
There is no way to know how much damages a person may
have to pay if he is found guilty of committing libel. The
following instructions to the jury in a libel case, Coleman
v. MacLennan, may provide some suggestion to follow:
Sanson v. Krehbiel, 63 Kan. 670.
2Good v. Higgins, 99 Kan. 315-
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In case you find for the plaintiff, the next
question for you to determine is the amount of re-
covery. In this there is no mathematical rule that
the court can give you as a guide. You will assess
his damages in such sum as will compensate him for
all damages he has sustained as a necessary and
natural result of the publication of the article
charged, and in arriving at this you should consider
the injury, if any, to his feelings and his repu-
tation, and the humiliation, if any, caused by such
publication, and the injury, if any, to his business
and profession. If you find that the article was
published maliciously, as hereinbefore defined, you
may then if you see fit, assess damages, called
"punitive damages," in addition by way of smart-
money or punishment to the defendant for having pub-
lished the article in question, and for the purpose
of setting a wholesome example to others. I fur-
ther instruct you that punitive damages may not be
recovered by the plaintiff, nor allowed by you in
your verdict, unless you shall first find that the
plaintiff is entitled to recover actual damages in
some amount.
l
1Coleman v. MacLennan, 7£ Kan. 714.
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CHAPTER VI
DEFENSES
There are three absolute and complete defenses in civil
libel. They are truth, privilege, and fair comment and
criticism.
Truth
That truth is an absolute and complete defense is de-
rived from the theory that if the defamatory charges were
true and as a result of their publication the person charged
lost a good reputation, he had suffered no legal harm be-
cause he had not been deprived of anything to which he was
either morally or legally entitled. However, the law holds
that every derogatory charge or insinuation made against
a person is presumed to be false unless it is proved other-
wise. The burden to prove the defamatory charges to be
true falls upon the defendant. It is not enough for the
defendant to prove that the publication is in good faith
and that he believes the charges to be true. The proof
must be in evidence and also must counteract every detail
of the defamation.
Truth as an absolute and complete defense in civil
libel has long been established in Kansas. In the Castle
v. Houston case, the Supreme Court has clearly states its
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reasons why truth is an absolute and complete defense in
civil libel and why a plea of truth alone will not be ac-
cepted in a criminal libel prosecution.
An article was published as follows:
The Insurance Department of our State will in all
probability be subject to a thorough investigation,
as a bill has already been introduced into the Senate
to investigate. This is right. Every insurance com-
pany in the State is willing an investigation be had.
Mr. Russell, ex-superintendent, invites it, and the
present superintendent is anxious for the same.
There is a cadaverous-looking individual of
Leavenworth loafing around here who seems exceedingly
anxious for an investigation, in hopes that the super-
intendent will be done away with and the department
presided over by the auditor. A clerkship in the
dim distance makes him enthuse. I cannot blame
Castle much, knowing that board and other bills too
numerous to mention have been pressing him for some
time, and then doubtless the Northwestern Life would
be glad to hear from him as he was published as a
defaulter to that company. He is one of the most
promising individuals (to his landlords) I know of,
and the cry of fraud from such a completely played
out insurance agent has but little bearing with an
intelligent body of legislators. If his caliber was
as large as his bore, he would be a success.
Jack.
Castle sued for libel and obtained a verdict for $1,250.
The defendant excepted and had moved for a new trial on the
basis of error in charging the jury. The motion for the new
trial was granted, and the plaintiff appealed from the order
to the Supreme Court. In ruling the appeal, the court care-
fully reviewed the whole doctrine of civil and criminal libel
and stated:
Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417.
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It was at one time the rule of the common law,
that the truth of the charge, however honorable and
praiseworthy the motives of the publisher, could not
be given in evidence in a criminal prosecution. Hence
originated the familiar maxim, "The greater the truth
the greater the libel." This doctrine was based upon
the theory, that where it was honestly believed a
particular person had committed a crime, it was the
duty of him who so believed or so knew, to cause the
offender to be prosecuted and brought to justice, as
in a settled state of government a party grieved
ought to comolain for an injury to the settled course
of law; and to neglect this duty, and publish the of-
fense to the world, thereby bringing the party pub-
lished into disgrace or ridicule, without an oppor-
tunity to show by the judgment of a court that he was
innocent, was libelous; and if the matter charged was
in fact true, {thereby insuring social ostracism,) the
injury caused by the publication was much greater than
where the publication was false. A false publication,
it was contended, could be explained and exposed; a
true one was difficult to explain away. As an addi-
tional reason for this rule, it was also held that
such publications, even if true, were provocative of
breaches of the peace, and the greater the truth con-
tained therein the greater the liability of hostile
meetings therefrom. That this was the true rule of
the common law has been denied by many of the ablest
jurists in both England and America, who maintained that
the liberty of the press consisted in the right to
publish with impunity, truth, with good motives and
"for justifiable ends, whether it respected government,
magistracy, or individuals. It certainly was derived
from the polluted source of the starchamber, and was
considered at the time an innovation, but like some
other precedents, although arbitrarily and unjustly
established, it came to be followed .generally by the
courts, and sustained as the law of the land. . .
The wise framers of our own constitution, peculiarly
acquainted with the beneficial influences of free
discussion and a free press, as participants in the
historical incidents and conflicts surrounding the
settlement of the territory of Kansas, modified the
tyrannical and harsh rule of the common law as stated
in the star-chamber of England, and thereafter gener-
ally understood and interpreted, by providing in
section 11 of our bill of rights, that
—
"The liberty of the press shall be inviolate; and
all persons may freely speak, write, or publish their
sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the
abuse of such right; and in all civil or criminal
.-;.•'.•.,:•..-• for Lilv.1, t.lu- l,ruth may bo given in evidence
to he jury, ana if it shall appear that the alleged
libelous matter was published for justifiable ends,
the accused party shall be acquitted."
Neverthless, these framers, in a spirit of wis-
dom, and to preserve order, were careful not to give,
as against the interests of the public, complete li-
cense even to the truth when published for the grati-
fication of the worst of passions, or to affect the
peace and happiness of society. They prescribe that
the accused should be acquitted, not on proof of the
truth of the charge alone, but it should further ap-
pear the publication was made for justifiable ends. .
While the rule of the common lav/, as generally
applied, was so exacting and rigorous to the defense
of justification in criminal prosecutions for libel,
a different doctrine was applicable in civil cases.
In the case of King v. Root, 4 Wend. 114, 139,
Chancellor Walworth
' clearly states this difference
as follows: "The difficulty which existed in England,
previous to Mr. Fox's libel act, was, that in crim-
inal prosecutions the defendant was not permitted to
give the truth in evidence; and yet the jury were
required to imply malice. But in civil cases, the
defendant was permitted to give the truth in evi-
dence as a full justification. Such was declared to
be the law by the judges at the time that bill was
under discussion in parliament, and there never has
been any alteration of the law in England on this
subject in civil suits." ...
Blackstone, in his Commentaries, asserts that the
truth could always be given in civil cases in justifi-
cation of libel, and seems to consider the defendant's
exemption. in such instances as extended to him in con-
sideration of his merit in having warned the public
against the evil practices of a delinquent. He says
that it is dammun absque injuria, (i.e., a damage
without legal wrong), intimating that the acts of
the defendant, who justifies a libelous publication,
do not constitute a wrong in its legal sense, and
then proceeds to observe that this is agreeable to the
reasoning of the civil law. . . This is illogical;
and Starkie bases this exemption on the better reason,
that in such instances the plaintiff has excluded him-
self from his right of action at law by his own mis-
conduct
,
and not to any merit appertaining to the de-
fendant. When a plaintiff is really guilty of the of-
fense imputed, he does not offer himself to the court
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as a blameless party, seeking a remedy for a malicious
mischief; his original misbehavior taints the whole
transaction with which it is connected, and precludes
him from recovering that compensation to which all
innocent persons would be entitled. . .
There are many good and sufficient reasons why a
publisher of a statement, true in fact, yet given to
the public with a malicious design to create mischief,
should be amenable to the criminal laws, and not be
liable in a civil action. On general principles no
right to damages can be founded on a publication of
the truth, from the consideration that the reason for
awarding damages in every such case fails. The right
to compensation in point of natural justice is founded
on deception and fraud which have been practiced by the
defendant to the detriment of the plaintiff. If the
imputation is true, there is no deception or fraud,
and no right to compensation. The criminal action in
libel is supported to prevent and restrain the com-
mission of mischief and inconvenience to society.
Take the case of two men who agree to engage together
in fisticuffs: the law for the protection of the
peace of society, and to prevent greater collisions,
may arrest and punish both combatants, and yet neither
may be able to recover from the other personal damages.
Where a person makes the publication solely to disturb
the harmony and happiness of society, or to mali-
ciously annoy and, injure the feelings of others, or
to create misery by exposing the latent and personal
defects of associates or acquaintances, the interests
of the public require some preventive notwithstanding
the truth of the publication. This. is furnished by
the criminal law. But mere injury to the imagination
or feeling, however malicious it may be in its origin,
or painful in its consequences, is not properly the
subject of remedy by an action for damages. Such of-
fenses being unconnected with any substantive right, are
incapable of pecuniary admeasurement and redress. They
admit of no exact definition; and, therefore, to extend
a remedy to such injuries generally, would be productive
of great uncertainty and inconvenience, and open far
too wide a field of litigation. Again, it seems to be
clear that a party who acquires an advantage by con-
cealing the truth, which he could not have attained to
had he divulged it, so far is guilty of fraud in the
concealment that he cannot upon any principle claim a
right to acquire that benefit, and therefore cannot
complain that he is injured by the publication of the
truth. . . In this view the truth hurts no one.
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In accordance with the doctrine that the defen-
dant is justified in law, and exempt from all civil
responsibility, if that which he publishes be true,
it is provided in the civil code, section 126, that
—
"In all actions mentioned in the last section,
(libel and slander,) the defendant may allege the
truth of the matter charged as defamatory, and may
prove the same and any mitigating circumstances, to
reduce the amount of damages, or he may prove either."
This section of the code may be construed to mean,
"in actions for libel or slander, the defendant may
allege the truth of the matter charged as defamatory,
and may prove the same (as a defense or full justifi-
cation,) and (he may also allege) any mitigating cir-
cumstances (in the same answer) to reduce the amount
of damaged, or he may prove either (the" truth as a
defense, or mitigating circumstances to reduce the
damages.)" In other words, under the code, the truth
is a full justification in a civil action; and in the
absence of justification, mitigating circumstances may
be set forth in the same answer, and the defendant may
prove either, or both. (Gen. Stat. 653.)
If it be contended that within the provisions of
the constitution, the proof of the truth as a. defense
in a civil action is no justification, except it be
also cade to appear that the publication was had forjustifiable ends, we answer, that in view of the rule
of law applicable in such cases at the time of the
adoption of the state constitution, we do not think
such a construction proper. It is not in accordance
with the spirit or the letter of that instrument. It
provides that in civil and criminal actions the truth
may be given in evidence to the jury, and where an
accused is on trial, that is, where a person charged
with a crime for the publication of alleged libelous
matter is being tried, he is not to be acquitted ex-
cept the publication is true and the same was published
for justifiable ends. In that event only is the ac-
cused party entitled to an acquittal. The word "ac-
cused" is used in the constitution; and an "accused"
being one who. is charged with a crime or misdemeanor,
it cannot well be said to apply to a defendant in a
civil action. If the motive of the party publishing
the truth is to be considered in civil suits, under
the constitution, then this section quoted, instead
of operating to the protection of individuals charged
in personal actions ."or damages for the publication
of alleged libelous matter, as was doubtless intended
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by the frafters of the constitution, would have the ef-
fect to hold parties responsible in cases where at
the common law they would be entitled to a verdict.
The constitution contains no grant of powers to the
legislature. It is only a limitation on the exercise
of its authority; and the legislature, in its discre-
tion, has the right to pass any act not violative of
the state or federal constitution. The object of sec-
tion 11 of the bill of rights was to prevent the pas-
sage of any law in Kansas restraining or abridging
the liberty of speech and of the press. By it, the
harsh rule of the common law, as generally recognized
in libel prosecutions, was greatly modified; but we
cannot seriously think that it was intended thereby
to abrogate that principle of the common law— sus-
tained and upheld under the exacting and arbitrary
construction of libels in England—that proof of the
truth is a complete justification in all civil ac-
tions. Nor can we believe that thereby it was in-
tended that the legislative power of the state was
forever deprived of conferring the right upon a de-
fendant in a civil action of libel to plead the truth
of the words charged as a full and complete defense.
To assert otherwise would be to assert that the con-
stitution abridged and curtailed the liberty of the
press in civil actions more than the common law
—
more than the provisions of the constitutions of
other states. The modification of the common law
by the constitution we construe in favor of the
liberty of the press, not against it. To conclude
otherwise would be to ignore the popular sentiment
in Kansas at the adoption of the constitution, and
assume that the successful contestants in behalf of
a free press were forgetful in their victories of
its powerful influences in their behalf, or had un-
wittingly deprived themselves of rights allowed in
England under the sway of despotic monarchs and the
rule of arbitrary judges. The constitution of Rhode
Island provides, "in all trials for libel, both civil
and criminal, the truth, unless published from mal-
icious motives, shall be sufficient defense to the
person charged." And it was held in that state that
the truth of the charge is a good defense in a civil
action for libel. (Perry v. Mann, 1 R.I. 263.)
From our review of the authorities, the provision of
our constitution, the civil and criminal codes, we
deduce these important principles:
First: In all criminal prosecutions, the truth
of the libel is no defense unless it was for public
benefit that the charged should be published; or in
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other words, that the alleged libelous matter was true
in fact, and was published for justifiable ends; but
in all such proceedings the jury have the right to
determine at their descretion of law and the fact.
Second: In all civil actions of libel brought by
the party claiming to have been defamed, where the de-
fendant alleges and establishes the truth of the matter
charged as defamatory, such defendant is justified in
law, and exempt from all civil responsibility. In such
actions the jury must receive and accept the direction
of the court as to the lav;.
Under this view . . . the order of the district
court setting aside the verdict of the jury in the
case and granting a new trial is affirmed.
All the Justices concurring.
Privilege
A privileged communication is a communication
which under ordinary circumstances would be defamatory,
made to another in pursuance of a duty, political,
judicial, social or personal, so that an action for
libel or slander will not lie, though the statement
be false, unless . . . actual malice be proved in
addition. 2
There are two kinds of privilege: absolute privilege
and qualified privilege or conditional privilege.
Absolute privilege is strictly limited both to persons
and occasions and, in fact, has no practical concern for a
journalist
.
The Kansas Supreme Court has stated that absolutely
privileged communications ordinarily pertain to officials
Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 417.
2
Newell Slander and Libel, Section 340, 4th edition,
p. 3S0.
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engaged in some form of public service. The privilege is not
intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the
public service as for the promotion of the public welfare.
Qualities of conditional privilege, which rests upon
the doctrine of public policy and convenience, is granted
on certain occasions. In defining conditional privileged
communication, Justice Wedell, in Faber v. Byrle case, has
quoted the statement form 33 Am. Jr., Libel and Slander,
section 126, as follows:
A publication is conditionally or qualifiedly
privileged where circumstances exist, or are reasonably
believed by the defendant to exist, which cast on him
the duty of making a communication to a certain other
person to whom he makes such communication in the per-
formance of such duty, or where the person is so sit-
uated that it becomes right in the interests of so-
ciety that he should tell third persons certain facts,
which he in good faith proceeds to do. This general
idea has been otherwise expressed as follows: A
communication made in good faith on any subject matter
in which the person having a corresponding interest or
duty, even though it contains matter which, without
this privilege, would be actionable, and although the
duty is not a legal one, but only a moral or social
dutyof imperfect obligation. The essential elements
of a conditionally privileged communication may ac-
cordingly be enumerated as good faith, an interest
to be upheld, a statement limited in its scope to this
purpose, a proper occasion, and publication in a proper
manner and to proper parties only. The privilege a-
rises from the necessity of full and unrestricted
communication concerning a matter in which the parties
have an interest or duty, and is not restricted within
any limits.
*
This definition is broad and wide. Thus, where a banker
is asked for information as to the credit of a business cor-
poration and its officers, and his answer contains libelous
^Faber v. Byrle, 171 Kan. 33.
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matter concerning the secretary of the corporation, but
within the reasonable purview of the inquiry, the communica-
tion is conditionally privileged.
If a hardware salesman was discharged for dishonest
concerning collections from customers and the employer
wrote a letter to be shown to its customers stating the
reasons for the discharge of the plaintiff, the court held
that such a letter related to a subject of mutual interest
to the company and the customers and was conditionally
privileged.
In case the officers of a church, upon inquiry, find
that their pastor is unwortny and unfit for his office,
and in the performance of what they honestly believe to
be their duty towards other members and churches of the
same denomination, publish, in good faith, in the church
papers, the result of their inquiry, and there is a reason-
able occasion for such publication, it will be deemed to be
3privileged and protected under the law.
When a publication is held to be conditionally priv-
ileged, malice is not presumed. With respect to such a
publication one seeking to recover for libel is obliged to
allege, and must prove express malice. This situation is
well summarized in the Beyl case:
Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47.
2
High v. A.J. Harwi Hardware Co., 115 Kan. 400.
^Redgate v. Roush, 61 Kan. 4^5.
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In the Coleman case ... it was held that if
the publication be conditionally privileged the
plaintiff must prove malice—actual evilmindedness,
or fail. In the Stone case ... it was said that
malice cannot be inferred and is not to be presumed
from a publication that is held to be qualifiedly
privileged. In Steenson v. Wallace ... it was
said that with respect to a publication condition-
ally privileged a plaintiff is obliged to allege
and must prove express malice. In The Faber case. . .
it was held that there is no liability on a condi-
tionally privileged communication, absent the exis-
tence of malice, and that in such a case the burden
of proof is on the plaintiff to establish malice.
In other words, when a qualified or conditional pri-
vilege exists with respect to a publication one
seeking to recover damages therefore must allege
and prove actual malice.
1
Newspapers are privileged to publish news about judicial
and legislative proceedings even though statements made in
them are libelous and damaging to persons involved. The
privilege arises from the fact that "it is desirable that
the trial of causes should take place under the public
eye, not because the controversies of one citizen with
another are of public concern, but because it is of -the
highest moment that those who administer justice should
always act under the sense of public responsibility, and
that every citizen- should beable to satisfy himself with
his own eyes as to the mode in which a public duty is per-
formed." 2
13eyl v. Capper Publication, Inc., 180 Kan. 527.
2Hale, William G., The Law of the Press , third edition,
St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1946, p. 87.
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In the case of Harper v. Huston, the. Supreme Court ruled
that the report of a preliminary hearing was privileged though
it contained only part of the hearing, and was published
separately.
Huston as publisher of the Columbus Daily Advocate ran
a story concerning a preliminary hearing of charges of mur-
der against John Harper. The hearing was adjourned at about
three o'clock in the afternoon and the story went to the
press about thirty minutes later, giving a synopsis of the
evidence of various witnesses who testified in the forenoon
hearing. Further testimony taken at an adjourned hearing
was not published. Harper was discharged by the justice,
and only the ultimate facts showing his discharge were
published.
Harper contended that Huston, instead of publishing
either a full or abridged report of the proceeding, published
garbled extracts thereby, ignoring the testimony on behalf
of Harper. Harper sued the publication for libel.
Court decision:
The articles; complained of show that they were
abridged and condensed. They didnot purport to give
a full account of the preliminary examination, nor
were they in our opinion, garbled accounts of the
proceedings.
It has been held that the published report of ajudicial proceeding may be abridged or condensed,
provided it is not unfair to the complaining party. . .
The two articles must be considered together, and,
in order for them to constitute libel against the
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plaintiff, it would have been necessary to allege that
they falsely conveyed the information or impression to
the readers of the newspaper that John Harper was guilty,
as charged; that the publisher conveyed and intended
to convey that meaning, and that he knew that the mean-
ing conveyed by the articles quoted was that John Har-
per was not guilty and that he was fully exonerated.
Under the circumstances there was no necessity for
publishing the testimony of the witnesses alleged to
have testified favorable to him . . .
The trial of the Stone case has verified the privilege
in warrants in Kansas . The Hutchinson Daily Mews ran a story
based on a search and seizure warrant issued by a Justice of
the Peace, and on which the sheriff had made a return, and
on an affidavit which described the missing property
—
stated who took it and included detail of the arrangement
entered into between the owners of the property and those
taking it
.
Two persons mentioned in the affidavit as having en-
tered into certain arrangements filed suit, claiming that
neither the warrant nor the affidavit was privileged, and
the contents of both were false malicious, and defamatory.
The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled otherwise:
Court decision:
Was such an affidavit privileged and such an ar-
ticle in a newspaper qualifiedly privileged? . . .
This affidavit was evidence in the case given before
and accepted by the justice and must be treated like
so much testimony given in the case. The neglect of
the court to make a formal order, if there was such
neglect , would not change the character of the evi-
dence as privileged in a regular judicial proceeding.
. . . We have no hesitancy in calling the search
and seizure case before the justice a judicial pro-
ceeding and the affidavit of Randall a proper paper
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to be filed therein, and such as in expected and re-
quired by statute to be filed in order to furnish
the justice with the 'satisfactory proof referred
to in the statute, and therefore a privileged document,
except as to Randall, the maker thereof.
Next, was the published article, even though based
in part on a privileged paper used in a judicial pro-
ceeding, qualifiedly privileged? The following quo-
tations announce the recognized rulesfor the deter-
mination of this question:
'Judicial proceedings do not protect statements
made therein, except such statements' as may fairly
or reasonably be made in such proceedings. But still
,
we think that the interests of justice require that
courts should construe all things said in judicial
proceedings liberally, so as to protect the persons
making the statements from unreasonable prosecutions
for slander or libel.' (Bailey v. Dodge, 28 Kan. 72,
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.
)
'The report must present fully and fairly an im-
partial account of the proceedings. It must also be
accurate, at least in regard to all material matters.
The publication may consist of an abridged or con-
densed statement. It is not necessary that the report
be verbatim. A substantially accurate report may be
privileged although of only a part of the proceedings.
But it must contain the substance of the thing it under-
takes to present, or the whole purport of any special,
separable part. It must not give unaue prominence to
inculpatory facts, and depress or minify such facts as
will explain or qualify the former, and must not omit
material points in favor of the complaining party, or
introduce extraneous matter of a nature injurious to
him. In short, the. report must be characterized by
fair-mindedness, honesty, and accuracy.' (36 C.J.
1274.)
V/as the article characterized by fair-mindedness,
honesty and accuracy? Was it within the limits of the
rules above stated, which are necessary to make it
qualifiedly privileged? . . . Certainly the ommission
from the published article of entirely extraneous
matter contained in the affidavit is not in any way
unfair to the plaintiffs. These words and statements,
while not literally accurate or exact quotations, are
reasonable inferences, and are not in any way exagger-
ations or overstatements, but different language only,
with substantially the same import and plainly within
the reasonable meaning of the language of the affidavit.
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'In determining whether a newspaper article is
libelous per se, headlines and the body of the article
must both be regarded. Each statement must be con-
sidered in connection with the others, and the whole
must be fairly and reasonably construed.' (Jerald
v. Houston, 124 Kan. 657, syl. 4,261 Pac. 851.)
We think the published article was fully within
the limits prescribed for the publishing of the priv-
ileged affidavit and therefore was qualifiedly priv-
ileged. . .
A newspaper has the qualified privilege to publish
matters involving violations of the lav/, justifying police
interference, and matters in connection with and in aid of
the prosecution of inquiries regarding the commission of
crime, even though the publication may reflect on the
individuals involved and tend to bring them into public
disrepute. An article was published in the Topeka Daily
Capital on May 26, 1954- It reads:
Grain Theft Ring Broken in Kansas
The 'key man' in a $60,000 grain theft shuttle
system has been caught and will go to preliminary
hearing today at Atwood, Atty. Gen. Harold R. Fatzer
said Tuesday.
Fatzer identified him as Keith Richard Beyl, 30»
of Cozard, Neb., and Salt Lake City.
Four semi-trailer trucks used in the grain thefts
in Kansas, Nebraska, South Dakota, Iowa, Idaho, and
Utah also have been detained, Fatzer said.
Kansas Bureau of Investigation officers and state
police of the other states had been working on the
thefts since January.
Beyl was arrested by KBI and Nebraska State
Patrol officers near North Platte, Neb., early the
morning of Kay 14. Fatzer said Beyl was taken to
Atwood, the county seat of Rawlins County, where he
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confessed 'to various operations in Kansas and named
several accomplices who are now being sought by KBI.'
Beyl is now being held in the Rawlins County jail
at Atwood on charges of grand larceny and burglary.
He was unable to make $5,000 bail.
Detainers also have been filed against Beyl at
Tribune and Hoxie, Kan., Grand and Beaver City, Neb.,
Logan, Utah, and Lana, Idaho.
Fatzer said one of Beyl's accomplices is in jail
at Koldredge, Neb., and that extradition to Kansas is
planned. The attorney general said he did not have the
accomplice's name, but that grand larceny charges will
be filed at Atwood.
The grain theft gang, Fatzer said, stole grain in
Kansas and other states in this area and hauled it to
the Salt Lake City vicinity for sale. Then, working
a shuttle system, the gang stole grain in Utah and
Idaho and sold it in Nebraska, Fatzer said.
In Kansas, grain thefts were reported from Russell,
Nemaha, Marshall, Rawlins, Greeley, and Sheridan Coun-
ties. Fatzer said between $5,000 and $6,000 worth of
wheat and some 1,000 bushels of corn had been stolen
in Kansas
.
The first reported theft' was about 600 bushels of
wheat in Russell County on January 24. Then came two
corn thefts of 450 to 500 bushels each from CCC bins
near Seneca and Karysville. On March 26 between 650
and 700 bushels of wheat were taken from a farm granary
in Rawlins County.
'In all instances,' Fatzer said, 'it was apparent
that large semi-trailer trucks were used to haul the
wheat away and that the thieves had their own augertype
grain loaders to load the wheat on their large trucks .
'
Sven after KBI officers were investigating, 600 .
bushels of wheat were taken from a bin near Tribune
and 600 to 650 bushels of wheat from a farm northeast
of Hoxie.
'In all cases KBI agents and local sheriffs were
able to secure plaster casts of tire tracks made by
".-; trucks in question,' the attorney general said.
'Comparisons with tire track evidence secured by state
authorities in South Dakota and Nebraska definitely
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indicated that the same gang of thieves was operating
in those states.
'
Just before the Rawlins County theft a large truck
trailer outfit was parked for several days on a side
street in Norton. On the night of the theft at Atwood,
March 26, the truck bearing Idaho and Wyoming tags dis-
appeared. Fatzer said the Norton chief of police had
jotted down the license numbers. These were traced,
while investigations of grain buying agencies in Neb-
raska, Colorado, and Utah continued.
Fatzer said it was 'finally ascertained' that
Beyl 'had made deliveries of wheat and corn elevators
in Nebraska and Salt Lake City within a day or two,
in each instance after the various thefts occurred
in Kansas .
'
The attorney general said that Beyl, during
questioning, admitted that he and his associates had
operated from Salt Lake City, 'perpetrating thefts
. in the Salt Lake valley around Logan in the vicinity
of Malan, Idaho, and hauling stolen grain from that
area to grain operators in Nebraska in the Cozard
and Omaha areas .
'
'After delivery of grain from the west, they
would steal grain in the central states of South
Dakota, Nebraska and Kansas and haul it back to the
Salt Lake area and sell it to the grain dealers
there,' Fatzer said. 'In one instance several truck-
loads were hauled as far west as California and sold
at Sacramento. '1
Keith R. Beyl sued the newspaper of libel.
Court decision:
On the face of things the article in question ob-
viously is a news story based upon an interview by de-
fendant with the attorney general relative to the op-
erations of an alleged grain theft ring in Kansas.
Much of the article directly quotes the attorney gen-
eral, and the remainder summarizes the information
given by that official.
LBeyl v. Capper Publications, Inc., ISO Kan. 532-533,
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We consider it unnecessary to attempt a lengthy-
discourse on the law of libel, the freedom and liberty
of the press, or the rights and liabilities of a news-
paper with respect to the many and varied circumstances
in which the question may arise. . . V.'e will attempt to
confine ourselves to what we consider to be the precise
question presented.
The rule is well established that it is within the
qualified privilege of a newspaper to publish in good
faith as current news all matters involving open vio-
lations of law which justify police interference, and
matters in connection with and in aid of the prosecu-
tion of inquiries regarding the commission of crime,
even though the publication may reflect on the individ-
uals concerned and tend to bring them into public dis-
grace. . .
By this is not meant that a newspaper is possessed
of free rein and immunity to print unfounded and unwar-
ranted scurrilous, unscrupulous and defamatory state-
ments about a citizen, but it is entitled, in the public
interest and dissemination of news, within good faith
limitations of fair comment, to publish the news per-
taining to such matters as are involved here, particu-
larly when, as here, the source of information is the
highest law-enforcement officer of the state.
Where- facts are not in dispute, and on demurrer
they of course are admitted, the question whether a
publication complained of is privileged is a question
of law to be decided by the court. . . There can be
no doubt but that under the facts here alleged the
defendant has what is known and referred to in the
law of libel as a qualified or conditional privilege. .. .1
Fair Comment and Criticism
Fari comment and criticism is very similar to qualified
privilege. But one must not confuse the one with the other.
Gatley, the noted English author, in distinguishing them,
says:
l-Beyl v. Capper Publications, Inc., op. cit., p. 526.
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The defense of fair comment must also be distingu-
ished from that of qualified privilege. In the defense
of fair comment the right exercised by the defendant
is shared by every member of the public. In that of
qualified privilege the right is not shared by. every
member of the public, but is limited to an individual
who 'stands in such relation to the circumstances that
he would be justified in saving and writing what would
be libelous or slanderous on the part of anyone else. .
On the application of the principle of fair comment to
a candidate for public office, Gatley days:
It is not now open to question that the publishers,
editors and proprietors of newspapers, and indeed all
other citizens, have the fullest and freest liberty to
discuss and comment upon the public acts and conduct of
a public man, and if they see fit, not only to criti-
.•.-.- i-.is acts and conduct in the most hostile spirit,
.-.-.v. in the severest terms, but also to assail and de-
nounce the man himself as unfit for his position for
rj-.e want of such qualities as wisdom, judgment, dis-
cretion, or skill, and the like, as evidenced by his
acts and conduct. One who undertakes to fill a public
office offers himself to public attack and criticism,
and it is now admitted and recognized that the public
interest requires that a man's public conduct shall be
open to the most searching criticism.
2
The same idea is expressed in Newell:
Every person has a right to comment on matters of
public interest and general concern, provided he does
so fairly and with an honest purpose. Such comments
ars r.ct libelous, however severe in their terms, unless
they are written intemperately and maliciously. Every
citizen has full freedom of speech on such subjects,
but he must not abuse it.
3
Fair comment and criticism is no privilege, nor is it
libelous. The opinion must be based on actual facts. The
^Gatley, op. cit., p. 332.
2Ibia., p. 353-
3
'Newell, op. cit., section ^77.
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natural subjects for criticism and comment are the following:
public officials; candidates for public office; public insti-
tutions; matters of public concern; scientific, artistic,
literary works; dramatic production and exhibitions; and
sporting events catering to the public.
Some states, such as Kansas, have extended qualified
privilege to fair comment and criticism concerning public
officials and candidates for public office. If a defamatory
statement concerning a public official or a candidate for
public office, which is honestly believed by the author to
be true, then this defamatory statement is qualified pri-
vileged. The reasons for treating defamatory statements
of facts concerning candidates for public office or public
officials as conditionally privileged are' fully and ably
set forth in Coleman v. MacLennan case.
In August, 1904, the plaintiff held the office of
Attorney General of the state and was a candidate for
re-election at the general election, which occurred in
the following November. By virtue of his office, he
was a member of the commission charged with the manage-
ment and control of the state school fund. The de-
fendant was the owner and publisher of the Topeka
State Journal, a newspaper published at Topeka, and cir-
culated both within and without the state. In the is-
sue of August 20, 1904, appeared an article purporting
to s'oate facts relating to the plaintiff's official
conduct in connection with a school fund transaction,
making comment upon them and drawing inferences from
thern. Deeming the article to be libelous, and plain-
tiff brought an action for damages against the de-
fendant, alleging that the matter published concerning
him was false ard defamatory, and that its publication
was the fruit of malice. Among other defenses the
defendant pleaded facts which he claimed rendered the
article and its publication privileged. . .
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The jury found generally for the defendant. A
motion for a new trial was denied, and the plaintiff
prosecutes error (i. e., carries the case to the
supreme court). The plaintiff claims that the court
committed grievous error in its instructions to thejury and by refusing to instruct according to the
plaintiff's requests; the instruction upon the sub-
ject of privilege being attacked with especial
fervency.
. .
-1
The opinions of the Supreme Court was delieved. by
Justice Burch as follows:
Beyond their importance to the immediate parties
the questions raised are of the utmost concern to ail
the people of the state. What are the limitations
upon the right of a newspaper to discuss the official
character and conduct of a public official who is a
candidate for reelection by popular vote to the of-
fice which he holds? . . .
Where the public welfare is concerned the individ-
ual must frequently endure injury to his reputation
without remedy. In' some situations an overmastering
duty obliges a person to speak, although his words
bring another into disrepute.
. .
We unhesitatingly reognize the fact that in many
cases, however damaging it may be to individuals, there
should and must be legal immunity for free speaking,
and that justice and the cause of good government would
suffer if it were otherwise. With duty often comes a
responsibility to speak openly and act fearlessly, let
the consequences be what they may; and the party upon
whom the duty was imposed must be left accountable to
conscience alone, or perhaps to a supervising public
sentiment, but not to the courts. (Cooley, Torts,
2d ed., 246.)
In other situations there may be an obligation to
speak which, although not so imperative, will under
certain conditions prevent the recovery of damages by
a party suffering injury from the statements made.
There are social and moral duties of less perfect ob-
ligation than legal duties which may require an inter-
ested person to make a communication to another having
-Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711.
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a corresponding interest. In such a case the occasion
gives rise to a privilege, qualified to this extent:
any one claiming to be defamed by the communication
must show actual malice or go remediless. This priv-
ilege extends to a great variety of subjects, and in-
cludes matters of public concern, public men, and can-
didates for office.
Under a form of government like our own there must
be freedom to canvass in good faith the worth of char-
acter and qualifications of candidates for office,
whether elective or appointive, and by becoming a can-
didate, or allowing himself to be the candidate of
others, a man tenders as an issue tc be tried out pub-
licly before the people or the appointing power his
honesty, integrity, and fitness for the office to be
filled. . '.
. . . It is of the utmost consequence that the people
should discuss the character and qualifications of can-
didates for their suffrages. The importance to the
state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and
the advantages derived are so great, that they more
than counterbalance the inconvenience of private per-
sons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional in-
jury to the reputations of individuals must yield to
the public welfare, although at times such injury may
be great. The public benefit from publicity is so great
and the chance of injury to private character so small,
that such discussion must be privileged. . .
There is great diversity of opinion regarding the
extent to which discussions of the fitness of candidates
for office may go. In England and Canada the limit is
fixed at criticism and comment, which, however, may be
severe, if fair, and may include the inferring of
motives for conduct in fact exhibited if there be foun-
dation for the inference. In some of our own states the
rule is more liberal, while in others it is more narrow.
According to the greater number of authorities the oc-
casion giving rise to conditional privilege does not
justify statements which are untrue in fact, although
made in good faith, without malice and under the honest
belief that they are true. A minority allows the privi-
lege under such circumstances. The district court in-
structed the jury according to the latter view, and the
instruction given has the sanction of previous decisions
of this court.
In the case of Kirkoatrick v. Eagle Lodge , 26 Kan.
3S4, 40 Am. Rep. 31°, a report was made to a grand lodge
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of Odd Fellows, by a special committee to which was
referred a petition respecting the expulsion of a
member of the order, stating that the officers of a
subordinate lodge to which the petition had been pre-
sented were of the opinion that the sworn statements
of the petition were infamously untrue. This report
was received, adopted, published in the grand lodge
journal, and distributed among the members of the order,
for whom it was intended. The court held that the oc-
casion for the publication prevented the inference of
malice and afforded a qualified defense depending upon
the absence of actual malice. The opinion distin-
guished between absolute and qualified privilege, and
said:
'Under this classification, which is fully sus-
tained by the authorities , the publication complained
of is only conditionally privileged, and as the aver-
ments in the petition are that the injurious publication
is false and malicious, and that the defendants, well
knowing its falsity, maliciously published it for the
purpose of bringing the plaintiff into public scandal,
infamy and disgrace, the petition states a cause of
action; but no recovery can be had thereon without
proof of express malice on the part of the defen-
dants, -chough the charge imputed in the publication
be without foundation.' (26 Kan. 391.)
But the rule of privilege is the same in both
civil and criminal actions. It is the occasion which
gives rise to privilege, and this is unaffected by the
character of subsequent proceedings in which it may be
pleaded.
In Balch's case a printed article making grave
charges against the character of a candidate for county
attorney was circulated among the voters of the county
previous to the election. In the opinion holding the
occasion to be privileged the court said:
'If the supposed libelous article was circulated
only among the voters of Chase county, and only for
the purpose of giving what the defendants believed
to be truthful information, and only for the purpose
of enabling such voters to cast their ballots more
intelligently, and the whole thing was done in good
faith, we think the article was privileged and the
defendants should have been acquitted, although the
principle matters contained in the article were un-
true in fact and derogatory to the character of the
prosecuting witness.
7&
.
. .
Gene illy, we think a person may in good
faith publish whatever he may honestly believe to be true,
and essential to the protection of his own interests or
the interests of the person or persons to whom he makes
the publication, without committing any public offense,
although what he publishes may in fact not be true,
and may be injurious to the character of others. And
we further think that every voter is interested in
electing to office none but persons of good moral
character, and such only as are reasonably qualified
to perform the duties of the office. This applies with
great force to the election of county attorneys.'
(31 Kan. 472.)
Substantially the same doctrine is the basis of
the following decisions: Mott v. Dawson, 46 Iowa, 533;
Bays v. Hunt, 60 Iowa, 251, 14 N. W. 785; Marks v.
Baker, 28 Minn. 162, 9 N. W. 678; The State v. Burn-
han, 9 N. H. 34, 31 Am. Dec. 217; Palmer v. Concord,
48 N. H. 211, 97 Am. Dec. 605; Carpenter v. Bailey, 53
K. H. 590; Briggs v. Garrett, 111 Pa. St. 404, 2 Atl.
513, 56 Am. Rep. 274; Press Company v. Stewart, 119
Pa. St. 564, 14 Atl. 51; Jackson, Appellant, v. Pitts-
burgh Times, 152 Pa. St. 406, 25 Atl. 613, 34 Am. St.
Rep. 659; Myers v. Longstaff, 14 S. Dak. 98, 84 N. W.
233; Express Printing Co. v. Corieland, 64 Tex. 354;
Shurtleff v. Stevens, 51 Vt. 501, 31 Am. Rep. 698;
Posnett v. Marble, 62 Vt. 48I, 20 Atl. 813, 11 L. R. A.
162, 22 Am. St. Kep. 126; O'Rourke v. Publishing Co.,
89 Me. 310, 36 Atl. 398; Crane v. Waters (C. C), 10
Fed. 619.
The plaintiff asks that the desicions of this court
quoted above be overruled, and that they be supplanted
by one which shall express the narrow conception of the
law of privilege held by the majority of the courts. . .
The fact that so many courts of this country, all of
high character, of great learning and ability, and all
equally interested in correctly solving the problems
of free government, differ from us, mades us pause; but
a reversal of policy and the overturning of what has
been so long accepted as settled law would be tantamont,
under the circumstances, to legislation. Such a step
ought not to be urged upon the court except for conclu-
sive reasons. What are the reasons supporting the ma-jority rule? The decision most freely quoted since it
was rendered, in 1893. and chiefly relied upon by the
plaintiff here, is that of the United States circuit
court of appeals for the sixth circuit in the case of
Post Publishing Company v. Hallair. , 16 U. S. App. 613
,
8 C. C. A. 201, 59 Fed. 530. Counsel in the case had
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argued from the duty of newspapers to keep the public
informed concerning those who are seeking their suf-
frages and confidence, and had asked if it were pos-
sible that the orivilege allowed in discussing the
character of public servants should be less than that
which protects defamatory statements made concerning
a private servant. The opinion states this argument,
and then proceeds as follows:
'The existence and extent of privilege in communi-
cations is determined by balancing the needs and good
of society v/ith the right of an individual to enjoy a
good reputation when he has done nothing which ought
to injure his reputation. The privilege should always
cease where the sacrifice of the individual right be-
comes so great that the public good to be derived from
it is outweighed. Where conditional privilege is ex-
tended to cover statements of disgraceful facts to a
master concerning a servant, or one applying for serv-
ice, the privilege covers a bona fide statement on
reasonable grounds to the master only, and the injury
done to the servant's reputation is with the master
only. This is the extent of the sacrifice which the
rule compels the servant to suffer in what was thought
to be, when the rule became law, a most important in-
terest of society. But if the privilege is to extent
to cases like that at bar, then a man who offers him-
self as a candidate must submit uncomplainingly to the
loss of his reputation, not with one person only, or
a small class of persons, but with every member of the
public whenever an untrue charge of disgraceful conduct
is made against him, if only his accuser honestly be-
lieves the charge upon reasonalbe grounds. We think
that not only is such a sacrifice not required of every
one who consents to become a candidate for office, but
that to sanction such a doctrine would do the public
more harm than good.
•We are aware that public officers and candidates
for public office are often corrupt when it is impos-
sible to make legal proof thereof, and of course it
would be well if the public could be informed in such
a case of ^^fhat lies hidden by concealment and perjury
from judicial investigation. But the danger that
honorable and worthy men may be driven from politics
and public service by allowing too great latitude in
attacks upon their character outweighs any benefit that
might occasionally accrue to the public from charges of
corruption that are true in fact but are incapable of
legal proof. The freedom of the press is not in danger
from the enforcement of the rule we uphold. No one
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reading the newspaper of the present day can be impres-
sed with the idea that statements of fact concerning
public men and charges against them are unduly guarded
or restricted, and yet the rule corr.plained of is the
law in many of the states of the Union and in England.'
(16 D. S. App. 652.)
Here the rule by which privilege is to be measured
is correctly stated, as in Wason v. Walter , L. R. 4
Q. B. (Eng.) 73—the balance of public good against
private hurt. The argument of counsel is then answered,
and the statement is made that a candidate ought not
suffer a loss in reputation with the whole public for
the public good. That is the question to be decided.
Then the sole reason for the decision is stated—that
honorable and worthy men will be driven from politics.
Then the consequences of the decision are commented
upon: Freedom of the press will not be endangered
—
an assertion, as shown by the manner in which public
men are handled by the press at the present time—an
appeal to experience for proof.
The single reason upon which the Hallam decision
is based is also in the nature of a prediciton, and is
not new. It was advanced in this country in 1808 by
Mr. Chief Justice Parsons (Commonwealth v. Clap , 4
Mass. 163, 3 Am. Dec. 212), and by Chancellor Walworth
in 1829, in the case of King v. Root
, 4 Wend. N. Y.
114, 21 Am. Dec. 102. Speaking in opposition to the
liberal doctrine the chancellor said:
'It is, however, insisted that this libel was a
privileged communication. If so, the defendants were
under no obligation to prove the truth of the charge;
and the party libeled had no right to recover unless
he established malice in fact, or showed that the
editors knew the charge to be false. The effect of
such a doctrine would be deplorable. Instead of pro-
tecting it would destroy the freedom of the press, if
it were understood that an editor could publish what
he pleased against candidates for office without
being answerable for the truth of such publications.
No honest man could afford to be an editor, and no man
who had any character to lose would be a candidate for
office, under such a construction of the law of libel.
The only safe rule to adopt in such cases is to permit
editors to publish what they please in relation to the
character and qualifications of candidates for office,
but holding them responsible for the truth of what they
publish.' (Page 139.)
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These predictions call to mind that of Lord
Thurlow, who, when protesting against the passage of
the Fox libel act, saidit would result in 'the con-
fusion and- destruction of the law of England. ' (2
Kay's Const. Hist, of Eng. 122.) The actual results
of the struggle ending in the enactment of that law
are stated by the author cited as follows:
'The press was brought into closer relations with
the state. Its functions were elevated, and its re-
sponsibilities increased. Statesmen now had audience of
the people. They could justify their own acts to the
world. The falsehoods and misrepresentations of the
press were exposed. Rulers and their critics were
brought face to face, before the tribunal of public
opinion. The sphere of the press was widely extended.
Not writers only, but the first minds of the age
—
men ablest in council and debate—were daily contri-
buting to the instruction of their countrymen. News-
papers promptly met the new requirements of their
positic;.. Several were established during this per-
iod whose high reputation and influence have survived
to our own time; and by fulness and rapidity of intel-
ligence, frequency of publication, and literary ability,
proved themselves worthy of their honorable mission to
instruct the people.' (2 May's Const. Hist, of Eng.
123.)
In opposition to the high authority of Kins v .
Root and the Kallam case may be placed Thomas M. Cooley,
who must be reckoned with in the discussion of any
question upon which he has deliberately expressed him-
self. Commenting on the foregoing quotation from King
v. Root
, he says:
'Notwithstanding the deplorable consequences here
predicted from too great license to the press, it is
matter of daily observation that the press, in its
comments upon public events and public men, proceeds
in all respect as though it were privileged; public
opinion would not sanction prosecutions by candidates
for office for publications amounting to technical
libels, but which were nevertheless published without
malice in fact; and the man who has a 'character to
lose' presents himself for the suffrages of his fel-
low citizens in the full reliance that detraction by
the public press will be corrected through the same
instrumentality, and that unmerited abuse will react
on the public opinion in his favor. Meantime the press
is gradually becoming more just, liberal and dignified
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in its dealings with political opponents, and vituper-
ation is much less common, reckless and bitter now than
it was at the beginning of the century, when repression
was more often resorted to as a remedy.' (Cooley's
Const. Lim., 7th ed. , 644, note.)
This statement of the results of Judge Cooley's
observation is in full accord with our own local ex-
perience. Without speaking for other states in which
the liberal rule applied in Balch's case prevails, it
may be said that here at least men of unimpeachable
character from all political parties continually pre-
sent themselves as candidates in sufficient numbers
to fill the public offices and manage the public in-
stitutions, and the conduct of the press is as honest,
clean and free from abuse as it is in states where
the narrow view of privilege obtains.
The fact that the public welfare has been promoted
in England by liberalizing the law of libel is freely
acknowledged in Vfeson v. Walker , L. R. 4. Q- R- (Eng.
)
73:
'Our view of libel has, in many respects, only
gradually developed itself into anything like a sat-
isfactory and settled form. The full liberty of pub-
lic writers to comment on the conduct and motives of
public men has only in very recent times been recog-
nized. Comments on government, on ministers and officers
of state, on members of both houses of parliament, on
judges and other public functionaries, are now made
every day, which half a century ago would have been the
subject of actions or ex officio informations, and would
have brought down fine and imprisonment on publishers
and authors. Yet who can doubt that the public are
gainers by the change, and that, though injustice may
often be done, and though public men may often have to
smart under the keen sense of wrong inflicted by hos-
tile criticism, the nation "profits by public opinion
being thus freely brought to bear on the discharge of
public duties?' (Page 93.)
Since the only reason given for the rejection of
the liberal rule fails, it is pertinent to inquire if
the consequences of narrov; rule are so innocuous as the
Hallam case asserts; and in doing so it must be borne
in mind that the correct rule, whatever it is must gov-
ern in cases other than those involving candidates for
office. It must apply to all officers and agents of
government—municipal, state and national; to the
33
management of all public institutions— educational, chari-
table and penal; to the conduct of all corporate enter-
prises affected with a public interest—transportation,
banking, insurance, and to innumerable other subjects in-
volving the public welfare. Will the liberty of the
press be endangered if the discussion of such matters
must be confined to statements of demonstrable truth,
and to what a jury may, ex post facto , say is 'fair'
criticism and comment? Will free discussion of the
subjects indicated by smothered if the newspapers under-
stand that they must respond in damages for deducing
and stating a wrong conclusion offact from strong cir-
cumstantial evidence indicating fraud, corruption or
other conduct injurious to the public, welfare?
The case of Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press
,
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Mich. 341i 9 N. W. 501, was decided upon a question of
pleading and a question of evidence. The opinion of
the court did not treat the subject of privilege. Mr.
Justice Cooley, however, took occasion to express him-
self upon the point now under consideration as follows:
'The beneficial ends to be subserved by public
discussion would in large measure be defeated if dis-
honest must be handled with delicacy and fraud spoken
of with such circumspection and careful and deferential
choice of words as to make it appear in the discussion
a matter of indifference. ... If such a discussion of
a matter of public interest were prima facie an unlawful
act, and the author were obliged to justify every state-
ment by evidence of its literal truth, the liberty of
public discussion would be unworthy of being named as
a privilege of value. It would be better to restore
the censorship of a. despotism than to assume to give
a liberty which can only be accepted under a responsi-
bility that is always threatening and may at any time
be ruinous. A caution in advance after despotic methods
would be less objectionable than a caution in damages
after in good faith the privilege had been exercised.
No public discussion of important masters involving
the conduct and motives of individuals could possible
be at the. same time valuable and safe under the rules
for which the plaintiff contends. It is a plausible
suggestion that strict rules of responsibility are
essential to the protection of reputation; but it is
most deceptive, for every man of common discernment
who observes what is taking place around him, and
what influences control public opinion, can not fail
to know that reputation is best protected when the
press is free. Impose shackles upon it and the
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protection fails when the need is greatest. Who would
venture to expose a swindler or a blackmailer, or to
give in detail the facts of a bank failure or other
corporate defalcation, if every word and sentence must
be uttered with judicial calmness and impartiality as
between the swindler and his victims, and every fact
and every inference be justified by unquestionable
legal evidence? The undoubted truth is that honesty
reaps the chief advantages of free discussion; and
fortunately it is honesty also that is least liable
to suffer serious injury when the discussion inciden-
tally affects it unjustly. ... In what I say in this
case I advance no new doctrines, but justify every
statement of principle on approved authorities. It
will be freely admitted that there are decided cases
from which a different argument may be constructed,
but it is affirmed that they are no longer deserving
of credit if they ever were. The gradual and beneficial
modification of the law of libel is shown in Wason v .
Walker , L. R. 4 Q. B. 73, and in so far as it has been
modified it has been made more consistent with just
reason. While it is admitted that the public press is
often corrupt and often reckless in dealing with pri-
vate reputations, it is at the same time affirmed that
the duty of its conductors to abstain from such mis-
conduct is no plainer than is the obligation of the
authorities to refuse to impose penalties when in the
exercise of a just independence they make use of their
columns for the exposure of public wrong-doers to public
condemnation. The law, justly interpreted, is not
chargeable with the inconsistency of tempting conductors
of the press with a deceptive pretense of liberty, and
then punishing them in damages if they act upon the
assumption that the liberty is genuine.' (Pages 3S2-
364.)"
If it be said that this argument contains an element
of prophecy, it may be replied that it will support the
liberal rule as well as the same kind of prophecy in
the Hallam case supports the narrow rule. The Hallam
case quotes the following discrimination of the two
rules made by Lord Chancellor Herschel, in Davis v .
Shepstor.e , 11 App. Cas. (Sng. ) 187:
'There is no doubt that the public of a public
man may lawfully be made the subject of fair comment
or criticism, not only by the press, but by all mem-
bers of the public. But the distinction can not be
too clearly borne in mind betiveen comment or criticism
and allegations of fact, such as that disgraceful acts
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have been committed or discreditable language used.
It is one thing to comment upon or criticize, even
with severity the acknowledged or approved acts of
a public man, and quite another to assert that he
has been guilty of particular acts of misconduct.'
(Page 190).
This statement is one of elucidation merely, and
furnishes no reason for a choice between the rules.
It may be observed, however, that the decisions in
England are in great conflict upon the question whether
fair comment is a branch of the law of privilege.
Only last year a writer in the Law Quarterly Review
(vol. 23, p. 97) called attention to this fact, and
expressed the hope that the case of Thomas y. Brad-
bv.ry, Agnew & Co"., Limited
,
(1906) 2 K. B. 627, might
be taken "co the House of Lords, so that the defense
of fair comment might be reviewed and placed upon some
logical basis. It may be observed further that the
distinction between comment and statements of fact
car: not always be clear to the mind. Expression of
opinion and judgment frequently have all the force
of statements of fact, and pass by insensible grada-
tions into declarations of fact. In England fair
comment includes the inference of motives, if there
be foundation for the inference. ( Hunter v. Sharp
e
,
3 B. & S. Eng. 769.) In the latter case Mr. Uhier
Justice Cockburn said:
'I think the^ fair position in which the law may
be settled is this: that where the public conduct of
a public man is open to animadversion, and the writer
who is commenting upon it makes imputations of his
motives which arise fairly and legitimately out of his
conduct, so that a jury shall say that the criticism
was not only honest, but also well founded, an action
is not maintainable.' (Page 775-)
This doctrine is repudiated in-Hamilton v. Eno,
81 N. Y. 116, and Negley y. Farrow , 60 Md. 158, 45
Am. Rep. 715, both cited in support of the Hallam
decision.' What is a charge of intoxication—an in-
ference from conduct and appearances, and therefore
fair comment, or the statement of a fact? What is
the difference between a charge of intoxication and
the following:
'Having appsarances which were certainly consist-
ent with the belief that they had imbibed rather freely
of the cup that inebriates. Their condition in the
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chaoel also led one to such a conclusion.' ( Davis v .
Duncan , L. R. 9 C. P. Eng. 396.)
In England this statement is fair comment. In New
York, no matter how strongly appearances and conduct
may justify the inference, a charge of intoxication
made against a oublic officer must be fully proved.
( King v. Root , Went. N. Y. 114, 21 Am. Dec. 102.) In
keeping plain the distinction between comment and
statements of fact the courts of some of the states
leave the law very much in the attitude of saying to
the newspaper: "You have full liberty of free dis-
cussion, provided, however, you say nothing that
counts.
'
The Hallam case quotes the supreme court of Ohio
in opposition to the liberal doctrine, as follows:
'We do not think the doctrine either sound or
wholesome. In our opinion, a person who enters upon
a public office, or becomes a candidate for one, no
more surrenders to the public his private character
than he does his private property. Remedy by due
course of law, for injury to each, is secured by the
same constitutional guaranty, and the one is no less
inviolate than the other. To hold otherwise would,
in our judgment, drive reputable men from public
positions, and fill their places with others having
no regard for their reputation, and thus defeat the
object of the rule contended for the overturn the
reason upon which it is sought to sustain it.' ( The
Post Publishing Co. v. Moloney
, 50 Ohio St. 71, 89,
33 K- E. 921.)
Manifestly a candidate must surrender to public
scrutiny and discussion so much of his private character
as affects his fitness for office, and the liberal rule
requires no more. Eut in measuring the extent of a
candidate's profert of character it should always be
remembered that the people have good authority for
believing that grapes do not grow on thorns nor figs
on thistles. The other arguments furnished by, the
Ohio quotation have already been considered. The
Hallam case contains nothing further worthy of note. . .
. . . Speaking generally, it may be said that
the narrow rule leaves no greater freedom for the dis-
cussion of matters of the gravest public concern than
it does for the discussion of the character of a private
individual. It is a matter of common exoerience that
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whatever the instructions to juries may be they do not,
and the people do not, hold a newspaper publisher guilty
and brand him a calumniator if in an effort in good
faith to discharge his moral duty to the public he
oversteps that rule. . .
The liberal rule offers no protection to the un-
scrupulous defamer and traducer of private character.
The fulminations in many of the decisions about a Tela-
monian shield of privilege from beneath which scur-
rilous newspapers may hurl the javelins of false and
malicious slander against private character with im-
punity are beside the question. Good faith and bad
faith are as easily proved in a libel case as in other
branches of the law, and it is an every-day issue in
all of them. The history of all liberty—religious,
Dolitical, and economic—teaches that undue restrictions
merelv excite and inflame, and that social progress is
best facilitated, the social welfare is best preserved
and social justice is best promoted in presence of the
least necessary restraint.
Aside from other reasons for adhering to it, the
court is of the opinion that the rule in Balch's case
accords with the best practical results obtainable
through the law of libel under existing conditions,
that it holds the balance fair between public need and
private right, and that it is well adapted to subserve
all the high interests at stake—those of the individ-
ual, the press, and the public. . .
The judgment of the district court (which was for the
defendant) is affirmed.
This Coleman v. McLennan case was a milestone decision
in establishing the privilege of the press to criticize
public officials and condidates with regard to their qual-
ifications and actions. No other court decision had ever
given the press so wide and so solid a base of privilege in
commenting on public officials and candidates. Since then,
this opinion, along with that given in the Balch case, con-
tinues to govern procedure in Kansas courts. In 1935, the
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Supreme Court upheld this liberal doctrine of privilege in
the case of Major v. Seaton, 142 Kan. 274. An article was
published in the Morning Chronicle of Manhattan in regard
to the coming election. The article reads:
WHAT A DECEIVER
What a deceiver Kurst Majors has turned out to be
in his relations to the Manhattan public!
Telling us he could not get the public service
commission at Topeka to do anything about a hearing on
the telephone rate matter, and, at the same time,
leading the public service commission at Topeka to
believe he did not wish the case he brought as major
pushed, and also neglecting to file with the commission
the briefs he had promised to file, so the case could
be decided!
Making us believe that he was fighting for our
interests against the electric company, even when he
was drawing the mayor's salary from the city and was,
at the same time, on the pay roll of the electric
company's coldstorage plant!
Working under cover to get a franchise for the
electric company in Manhattan, at the same time he
was supposed by the public to be earning his salary
as mayor by fighting the utility companies and looking
after our interests!
Refusing with his mouth at a mass meeting what he
denounced as a bribe, and accepting it with his hands!
Think of the gall he showed by accepting his two pay
checks—one from the city and one from the cold-
storage company—and, with brazen callousness under
the circumstances, cashing them at local banks!
What must such supporters of Hurst Majors as be-
lieved him sincere in his profession of friendship for
the people of Manhattan think of him now!
What must Colonel George Frank, who fought for him
up and down the streets of Manhattan then, think of him
now!
S9
What must Dr. C. 0. LaShelle, that sterling demo-
crat who Manhattan hopes will receive the democratic
nomination for congress in this district, and who
lined up Aggieville for him then, think of him now!
Ask them!
None of them support him today, as do not also
hundreds of his former partisans.
And what must Judge C. A. Kimball, that old war
horse who sincerely favors municipal ownership of
public utilities, who believed in Hurst's sincerity,
and who has been the brains behind the Hurst Majors
front all these years—what must he think of the
Mayor who sold out his constituents, his friends,
and his political principles, if any, now that the truth
about Hurst Majors is coming to light, and the hollow-
ness of his professions!
The time has come when Manhattan should state in
no uncertain terms what it thinks of such a man as
Hurst has showed himself to be, by voting Tuesday an
emphatic No to his desire to get back on the public
pay roll.
Let him work honestly for his living.—F. N. S.
Feeling himself aggrieved, Hurst Majors instituted
suit, alleging that the publication provoked him to wrath,
exposed him to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, charged
him with bribery and misconduct in office; that it was unfair
and untrue and maliciously published his actual damage in
the sum of $20,000 and because of malice he should have
$10,000 as punitive damages, for which he prayed.
Seaton's answer admitted the publication, and the can-
didacy of plaintiff. He stated that he bacame advised of
certain facts, investigated them, and then wrote and published
•^Majors v. Seaton, 142 Kan. 274.
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the article. There was denial that the language used was
intended to charge plaintiff with the crime of bribery and
an allegation that it did not so charge, and specific re-
ference was made to a speech by plaintiff wherein plaintiff
said: "When I take an offer, I am going to take it in
marked bills and a lot of them." The defendant alleged
that the language of the article complained of was designed
to state that plaintiff had accepted with his hands that
which with his mouth he had denounced as a bribe. He fur-
ther answered that he believed each statement in the ar-
ticle to be true and that the publication was without malice
and was made solely in discharge of his duty as a newspaper
publisher to advise the voting public of the facts set
forth.
The trial was by a jury which rendered a verdict for
$1,000 actual and $750 punitive damages. Defendant ex-
cepted and the case was brought to the Supreme Court. The
decision of the court is as follows:
. . . We shall content ourselves by saying that in
the situation here presented, it was the right, if
not the duty, of the defendant to call to the atten-
tion of the citizens of Manhattan the facts which he
honestly believed to be true, together with such
comment thereon as was reasonably connected there-
with, for the purpose of enabling the electors to
vote more intelligently at the coming election, and
if all was done in good faith, the publication was
privileged even though some of the statements might
be untrue and derogatory to the character of the
candidate. There is no showing of lack of good
faith except though an involved process of reasoning;
that is, that the statements of the article charge
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plaintiff with bribery and misfeasance in office, are
presumed to be false and are therefore malicious.
That theory will not avail here (Coleman v. MacLennan,
.
supra), and even if it would, it still would not help,
for, as has been demonstrated, plaintiff's admission
are that the statements of fact in the publication
are substantially correct, or at least so nearly so
that the attempt to show wherein they are not is a
mere quibble. The publication was conditionally
privileged, there was no showing of malice, and under
the admitted facts plaintiff could not recover. 1
It is obvious that conditional privilege is granted to
newspapers as well as others in their commenting upon public
officials and candidates for public office. But what is
a "public office" and who is a "public official"? This
is well defined in the case of Sower v. Wells:
What is a 'public office' and who is a 'public
officer'? While the authorities are not in complete
harmony in defining the term 'public office,' or
'public officer,' it universally has been held that
the right to exercise some definite portion of sov-
erign power constitutes an indispensiable attribute
of 'public office.' (46 C. J., p. 928, 20b; Wyman's
Adminsitrative law, p. 163, 44, Anno. 53 A. L.R. 595;
93 A. L. R. 334; 4 Words & Phrases, 5th Series, pp.
332-334.) In Kingston Associates v. La Guardia, 281
N. Y. S. 390, 156 Misc. 116, in distinguishing between
'public office,' and an 'employment.' the New York
court said:
'There is, however, one indispensable attribute
of public office, namely, the right to exercise some
portion of the sovereign power. 'Public office' has
been defined by Machem in his work on Public Officers,
previously referred to as the right, authority and
duty, created and conferred by law, by which for a
given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the
pleasure of the creating power, an individual is in-
vested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public. The author quotes with approval
"Majors v. Seaton, 142 Kan. 274.
92
the following language of the judges of the supreme
court of Maine in Opinion of Judges, 3 Greenl. (3
Me.) 4S4: 'We apprehend that the term "office" im-
plies a delegation of a portion of the sovereign
power to, and the possession of it by, the person
filling the office . . . The power thus delegated and
possessed may be a portion belonging sometimes to one
of the three great departments and sometimes to a-
nother, still it is a legal power which may be right-
fully exercised, and in its effects it will bind the
rights of others, and be subject to revision and cor-
rection only according to the standing laws of the
state. An employment merely has none of these distin-
guishing features.' In Dawson v. Knox, supra, the
same thought was expressed by the appellate division,
third department (231 App. Div. 490, page 492, 247
N. Y. S. 731, 734): 'The duties of a public official
involve some exercise of sovereign power—those of a
public employee do not.' In Peopel, ex rel. Koefle,
v. Cahill, 188 N. Y. 489, 494, 81 N. E. 453, 454, the
court of appeals quoted with approval the following
language of the appellate division in Peoole, ex rel.
Corkhill, v. McAdoo, 98 App. Div. 312, 314, 90 N. Y.
S. 689,691: 'The essential element in a public office
is that the duties to be performed shall involve the
exercise of some portion of the sovereign power, whether
great or small.' (p. 398.)
In matter of Dawson v. Knox, 231 App. Div. 490,
492, 247 N. Y. S. 731, it was said:
'The holder of a public office is in the employ-
ment of the public, but all those who are in the public
employment are not public officials and do not hold
public office.
'
In State, ex rel. Pickett, v. Truman, 333 Mo. 1018,
c-4 S. W. 2d 105, the Missouri court held a delinquent
tax attorney was not a public officer, though his duties
were substantially the same as those of a special tax
attorney in New Mexico. In McDuffie v. Perkerson,
178 Ga. 230, 173 S. E. 151, 157, the Georgia court,
in holding a grand juror was not a public officer,
said:
'In this state it has been held that an individual
who has been appointed or elected in a manner pre-
scribed by law, who has a designation or title given
him by law, and who exercises functions concerning the
public, assigned to him by law, is a public officer.'
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CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Summary
Basically, libel is any published defamation without
legal justification or excuse.
Libel may be in the form of written or printed words,
cartoons, signs, pictures, effigies, or representations of
the like of a defamatory character.
In order to constitute a libel, it is not necessary
that the publication imputes the commission of crime or
unchastity; it is a libel to make a false publication
which holds a person up to public hatred, ridicule, obloquy,
or contempt, or which is calcualted to injure one in his
trade, business, profession, or calling, by imputing dis-
honesty, fraud, incapacity, incompetency or other dis-
graceful conduct.
There are two kinds of libel— civil and criminal.
Civil libel arises when an individual is defamed by a
false publication and thus injured. The purpose of the pro-
secution is to collect damages.
Criminal libel arises when a publication is made falsely
and maliciously, which tends to "provoke a breach of the
peace." The purpose of this prosecution is to punish the
publisher for his misconduct.
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Not all defamatory statements are actionable. In civil
libel suits, an actionable statement must contain these
elements
:
(1) the statement is defamatory in its character
within the meaning of the law;
(2) the statement has been published, as the law
defines the term "published";
(3) the person or persons defamed by the statement
can be identified by the reasonable reader;
(4) and the defamatory statement has no legal excuse
or defense.
All persons who take part in the publication of a libel
or who procure its publication may be sued by the person
defamed.
Unintentional publication of a libel has no defense in
libel suit. Nor does the omission of the name of a libeled
person in a publication permit the publisher to escape
liability. The law holds that it is sufficient if the
reasonable reader understands that the defamatory words are
referring to the plaintiff.
The statute of limitations in Kansas as to actions for
civil libel is one year, meaning that if an individual de-
famed by a publication wants to sue for libel, he must do so
within one year of the date of the publication of the libelous
matter. But in computing the time, a person's military ser-
vice period shall not be included.
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All libel cases fall either in libel per se or libel
per quod.
Libel per se is a publication which upon its face and
without using an innuendo or the aid of extrinsic proof,
reveals injury and damages to the person concerning whom it
is written. It- is a publication in which malice is implied
and damages are conclusively presumed to result.
Libel per quod means that the words of the publication,
innocent on their face, prove to be libelous because of the
consequence of the extrinsic facts or of the surrounding
circumstances existing at the time. In the State of Kansas,
statement of libel per quod is not actionable unless damage
is pleaded and shown in the trial court.
In case of libel per quod, usually an innuendo is used.
The function of an innuendo is to establish the defamatory
nature of the language, which in itself is not libelous, or
to establish the fact that the plaintiff was meant or was
referred to in the publication. When an innuendo is used,
it must not add to or restrict the obvious and natural
meaning of the published words.
Criminal libel is brought against a libelous publica-
tion which is maliciously made and which tends to disturb
the public peace or good order of society.
Penalty for criminal libel may be a fine or an imprison-
ment, or both.
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In addition to the area covered by civil libel, the
criminal libel also covers these grounds: libel of the
dead, libel of a member of a family, a sect or a group too
large to enable any individual member of the group to sue
for damages.
In Kansas, truth is not a complete defense in criminal
libel. In addition to truth the defendant must present
justifiable reasons for seeking relief.
Damages which may be recovered in a civil action for
libel may be classified as follows:
(1) Compensatory damages, consisting of:
(A) General damages—these are damages which the law
presumes must naturally, proximately and necessarily result
from the publication of the libelous matters. It is not
required that they be specifically pleaded and proved in
the trial court
.
(B) Special damages—these damages can be shown and
computed in terms of money. They are not the natural re-
sult of the defamatory publication and therefore must be
pleaded and the amount of damages proved in the trial court.
(2) Punitive damages
—
punitive damages, also called
exemplary damages , are damages awarded to the person de-
famed as punishment and deterrent upon the libeler. Malice
is essential in determining punitive damages.
(3) Nominal damages—nominal damages are awarded in
one of the two conditions. From all the circumstantial
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evidence of the case, it appears that the plaintiff has not
been altogether blameless or that no special damages have
been suffered and the- reputation of the plaintiff has been
vindicated.
Malice is an important element in determining the amount
of damages awarded. Malice is in law or in fact. Malice in
law is presumed in libel per se. Malice in fact springs from
bad motive and evil purpose. To prove that a publication is
lack of malice means that it is lack of malice in fact and
its redress will be in mitigation of damages.
To escape liability, there are three complete and ab-
solute defenses in civil libels. They are truth, qualified
privilege and fair comment and criticism.
In Kansas, truth is an affirmative defense. But the
law holds that every derogatory charge or insinuation made
against a person is presumed to be false unless it is proved
otherwise; and the burden to prove the defamatory charges to
be truth falls upon the defendant.
Newspapers are privileged to report judicial and legis-
lative matters as long as they are reported fairly, impar-
tially and without opinion or comment.
Everyone has a right to comment on matters of public
interest and concern, provided that the comment is fair and
is made with honest purpose. In regard to criticism of can-
didates for the holders of public office, Kansas follows the
minority rule, namely that it is possible to make statements
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that are factually untrue about men in these positions as
long as the publisher actually thought they were true and
was not motivated by malice.
Conclusion
No civil liberty is an absolute right. The constitu-
tional guarantee of freedom of the press is not a blanket
license to the press to do anything it wishes. The law of
libel is a legal restriction upon its freedom, the basis
of which is the protection of reputation. When reputations
are injured by libelous publications without legal justifi-
cation, those rrsponsible for such publication are either
subjected to civil law suits for the recovery of damages,
or subjected to criminal prosecutions for punishment of the
offenses.
However, publishers, editors and journalists as well
prefer the "largest liberty" for the press. In general,
a state which provides greater freedom is always a better
state in which to operate a newspaper. From the review of
the law of libel in Kansas, the author has recorded the
following findings
:
Kansas allows truth alone to be a complete defense in a
civil libel suit. But in criminal prosecution for libel,
truth alone is not a defense, it must be accompanied by just-
ifiable ends. These Kansas rules are the rules generally
adopted today by most of the other states. Only seven states,
99
i.e. Alabama, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado, Georgia,
Maryland, and North Carolina, 1 give more liberty to the
press and make the truth a complete defense in both civil
suits and criminal prosecution for libel, regardless of the
motive which prompted the publication. Eleven other states,
in addition to the proof of truth, require that the publi-
cation be made with good motives and/or for justifiable ends
as a defense in civil libel suits. These eleven states are
Florida, Rhode Island, Maine, Illinois, Nebraska, West
Virginia, Wyoming, Delaware, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
and New Hampshire. *•
In fact, the majority rule on the points mentioned
has much of fairness and sound policy to commend upon it.
A letter to the editor which was published in the Atchison
Daily Champion, March 10, 1878, made these points:
. . . that the members of the supreme court
struck the golden mean in deciding, on the one hand,
that the malicious and malignant libeler who assails
the reputation of another without justifiable ends,
solely to gratify his feelings of hate, or envy, or
dissension, can be severely punished under the pro-
visions of our criminal laws, even if the charges
are true; and, on the otherhand, that the impecunious
vagabond or graceless scoundrel shall not be able to
annoy newspaper editors, and obtain cheap notoriety,
from a judgment of one cent and costs in a civil
action of libel, as often as he is exposed, because
•-Arthur and Crosman, op. cit., p. 219, 220.
2Ibid.
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on the trial the editor, although proving the truth
of all the publications, fails to satisfy a jury of
twelve men that his purposes were entirely worthy and
commendable.*
In Kansas, the newspapers enjoy a greater privilege
than they do in most other states in commenting upon the
qualifications of public officials and candidates for pub-
lic office. The Supreme Court of Kansas has held that mis-
statements of facts made about candidates for public office
and public office holders are privileged as long as the
publisher acts with honest motives and has a reason to be-
lieve that what he prints is true facts. In the syllabus
written by Mr. Justice Burch, in Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, the following statement is made:
If the publisher of a newspaper . . . publishes
an article reciting facts, and making comment relating
to the official conduct and character of a state of-
ficer, who is a candidate for re-election, for the
sole purpose of giving to the people of the state
what he honestly believes to be true information, and
for the sole purpose of enabling the voters to cast
their ballots more intelligently; and the whole thing
is done in good faith—the publication is privileged,
although the matter contained in the article may be
untrue in fact, and derogatory to the character of
the candidate. 2
This decision has established a solid base in Kansas for
privilege to make comment about public officials and candid-
ates with regard to their qualifications and actions. It
should be noted that this opinion has been since governing
Castle v. Houston, 19 Kan. 435.
2Coleman v. MacLennan, 7& Kan. 714.
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the Kansas court and no evidence could be found contrary to
this decision.
This decision is very controversial. Some authorities
concerning libel laws agree with the decision and maintain
that the newspaper, because of its duty, should have the
same privilege of communication as a master regarding the
qualifications of a servant, or a citizen in reporting to
o
public authorities misconduct of a public officer. Pro-
fessor John E. Hallen, of the University of Texas, in the
Texas Law Review (Vol. B, 1929-1930) makes the following
statements:
If we recognize that candidates for office are
subjects in which both the writer and the reader prop-
erly have an interest, we may well ask why the privi-
lege should be said to include all kinds of situations,
in which there is a recognized interest by both parties
up to the realation between daily paper and subscriber
and then arbitrarily stopped so as not include that
relationship.
3
Another authority declared in Harvard Law Review (Vol.
22) the following:
. . . But in a country like our own, where public
offices are so generally elective, it would seem to be
of the utmost importance that the elector should have
every opportunity of hearing facts about the candidates,
and that one who has information which he bona fide be-
lieves to be true should not be deterred from communi-
cating it by a fear of incurring legal liability
See footnote of 69 Harvard Law Review, p. 875, 929.
(1956.) ' '
2Arthur and Crosman, op. cit .
,
p. 307.
3& Texas Law Review 4-1.
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therefor. The danger from unwarranted attacks is
done away with by requiring reasonable grounds for
belief in the information conveyed.
1
But there are numerous authorities who contend that the
newspaper should have no defense, other than truth. Judge
Taft, in Post Publishing Company v. Hallam, argued that,
because of the broadcasting of charges against candidates
for office, the sacrifice of the individual right in cases
of falsity outweighs the public good to be derived from
lifting the restrictions which the requirements of truth
impose. 2 It is also contended by another supporter of this
view that any encouragement given to mud-slinging in po-
litical campaigns tends to deter reputable candidates from
entering the lists.
3
Despite the objections of most learned authorities,
the Supreme Court of the United States in 1964 handed down
a landmark decision concerning this argument. In the case
of the New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, the
U. S. Supreme Court held that the first amendment does pro-
tect "libelous" speech to the extend that misstatement of
fact contained in criticism of the public officials are
privileged, if absent of malice.^
'•22 Harvard Law Review 445.
o
fcLaw of the Press
, op. cit., p. 119.
3Ibid.
^New York Times Co. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254.
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The Kansas rule, though still in the minority, has
been gaining ground especially after the recent landmark
decision of the U. S. Supreme Court.
In addition, a trend that qualified privilege be granted
to certain matters of fair comment has been found in the
recent judicial decisions in Kansas. The majority of
jurisdictions hold that fair comment is different from
qualified privilege. 1 Fair comment is the right of a per-
son to give his opinion on a fact which is a subject of pub-
lic interest. It is no libel. If the comment is proved to
be based or. falsity of facts and/or that there is no public
interest in the subject matter, then the comment is guilty
of being libel. 2
A qualified privilege is a defamatory statement made
upon a proper occasion, with a proper motive, and concerning
a reasonable cause, 3 and the proof of which will eliminate
the publisher from all liability.
In the case of Beyl v. Capper Publication, the court
has extended qualified privilege to matters involving an
arrest because of a qualified privilege to report facts
on matters of judicial proceedings. But is an arrest a
judicial proceeding? An article written by Tom Hampton in
-'-Hampton, Tom, Kansas University Law Review, Vol. 6,
p. 101.
2Ibid., p. 102.
3Ibid.
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University of Kansas Lav; Review , makes the following state-
ment :
Some jurisdictions will not allow comment upon
an arrest under the guise of judicial proceedings
because there has been no public hearing of any kind
and therefore no judicial proceedings. The theory is
that a case should not be prejudiced while pending.
Grundar v. New York Times Co., 37 F. Supp. 911 (1941);
Bresslin v. Star Co., 85 Misc. 609, 148 N.Y. Supp.
295, (sup. Ct. 1914); Lancour v. Harald & Globe Ass'n.,
Ill Vt. 371, 17 A. 2d 253 (1941); but see Thompson v.
Boston Publishing Co., 285 Mass. .344, 189 N.E. 210
(1934), criticised in Note, 14 B. U.L. Rev. 688 (1934).
Under these rulings a newspaper would have a qualified
privilege to publish facts as to the arrest and the
nature of the charges, but not a right to comment upon
those facts. The reported facts need not be verbatim,
but they must be a fair and accurate report. However,
when guilt is charged, insinuated or assumed, the priv-
ilege ceases.
-
1
-
The Kansas Supreme Court held, however, that the defen-
dant newspaper was entitled to print, within good faith lim-
itations of "fair comment," matters of public interest, and
that it had a "qualified privilege" to do so, particularly
when, as here, the source of information was from the At-
torney General.
This opinion has been affirmed in the decision in the
case of Stice v. Beacon Newspaper Corporation, 185 Kan. 61.
Obviously, the decision in the Stice case indicates that the
courts will continue this trend in Kansas of extending a
qualified privilege to matters of fair comment.
-'Hampton, Kansas University Law Review, Vol. 6, p. 102.
2For detail of the court decision, refer to p.
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In Kansas, any statement that carries the defamatory
imputation upon its face is held to be actionable without
proof of damage. But any statement which is not actionable
per so may be held to be actionable per quod when special
damage is pleaded and proved. This rule, in fact, is ac-
cepted by the owerwhelming majority of states. It is the
law in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Florida, George, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Utah, Washington,
and Wisconsin. It is probably also the law of Maine,
Michigan, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and South Dakota.
That the proof of special damage is essential to the
existence of the cause of action in libel per quod case has
given many advantages to the publishers. It is clear that
the proof of actual damage will be impossible in a great
many cases in which, from the character of the defamatory
words and the circumstance of publication it is all but
certain that the published article has resulted in libel.
This liberal rule has undoubtedly done away with many petty
spite suits against the publishers for trivial utterances.
Kansas has a very liberal "press law." Obviously, this
liberal "press law" has been strengthened and confirmed
•'-Virginia Law Review, Vol. A-6, p. S44.
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without exception by every test in the state Supreme Court.
It seems to be the rule of the state Supreme Court to cham-
pion the newspaper in libel suits as much as possible and
to make the press the public godfly and watchdog. In doing
so, of course, some of the individuals' interests have been
denied because of the emphasis on public good.
Despite the libel "press law" in Kansas, a journalism
student or a newspaper man must not take a chance that
could commit him to a libel suit. Whenever a libel suit
occurs, unnecessary time, energy, and perhaps financial
setbacks will incur to the publisher. Above all, no news-
paper of high ethical standards ever deliberately and mali-
ciously publishes a libel. A newspaper's purpose is, and
should be, to avoid legal difficulties.
This situation being true, better efforts should there-
fore be devoted to carrying on the proper research essential
in convincingly presenting factual information to readers.
An objection could be made concerning the time it takes to
delve into factual details before publishing a "hot" story.
This objection, of course, is valid only if the publisher
is out looking for trouble because he does not have enough
facts on hand before he begins material of grave concern
to certain parties.
Kasty decisions to get news into print may prove in-
jurious. Careful consideration of all available facts at
hand, for instance, may, in the long run, prove to be time
well spent.
10?
Careless reporting invites trouble, whether actionable
or not. The aim of this author is to indicate the areas in
which libel as it pertains to journalistic endeavors may oc-
cur, what the judgments were when actionable, and what pun-
itive actions, if any, were accorded by law.
Where a trial by jury is necessary, the author believes
that a decision reached will tend to be individualistic
rather than by precedent. Therefore, a decision on a par-
ticular libel suit reached, say, ten years ago may not be
the same as the decision of today. The author does not and
will not attempt to set down "rules of thumb" concerning
type of damages or of court decisions. Rather, he presents
examples from cases which he deems to be of interest and
to be informative.
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Libel laws are not always as clear as they might be;
they vary from time to time and from state to state. Student
who contemplates a newspaper career in Kansas without a
knowledge of libel laws in that state not only would be
foolish but also would court disaster.
Libel is any published defamation in a permanent form
without any legal excuse.
There are two kinds of libel—civil and criminal.
Civil libel arises when an individual is defamed by
a false publication and thus injured. The purpose of the
prosecution is to collect damages.
Criminal libel arises when a libelous publication is
considered "to provoke a breach of the peace." The pur-
pose of the prosecution is to punish the publisher for
his misconduct.
Not all defamatory statements are actionable. In
libel suits, an actionable statement must contain these
elements: (1) the statement is defamatory in its char-
acter within the meaning of the law; (2) the statement has
been published, as the law defines the term "published";
(3) the person or persons defamed by the statement can be
identified by the reasonable reader; (4) and the defamatory
statement has no legal excuse or defenses.
All libel cases fall either in libel per se or libel
per quod.
Libel per se is a publication which upon its face and
v/ithout using an innuendo or the aid of extrinsic proof,
reveals injury and damages to the person concerning whom
it is written. It is a publication in which malice is
implied and damages are conclusively presumed to result.
Libel per quod means that the words of the publication,
innocent ontheir faces, prove to be libelous because of the
consequence of the extrinsic facts or of the surrounding
circumstances existing at the time.
Damages which may be recovered in a civil action for
libel may be classified as compensatory damages, punitive
damages and nominal damages.
Malice is an important element in determining the
amount of damages awarded. Malice is in law or in fact.
Malice in law is presumed in libel per se case. Malice
in fact springs from bad motive and evil purpose. To prove
that a publication is lack of malice means that it is lack
of malice in fact and its redress will be in mitigation of
damages.
There are three complete and absolute defenses in civil
libels. They are truth, qualified privilege and fair com-
ment and criticism.
The Kansas law holds that every defamatory statement
made against a person is presumed to be false unless it is
proved otherwise; and the burden to prove the defamatory-
charges to be truth falls upon the defendant.
In regard to criticism of candidates for the holders
of public office, Kansas follows the minority rule, namely
that it is possible to make statements that are factually
untrue about men in these positions as long as the pub-
lisher actually thought they were true and was not mo-
tivated by malice.
